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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Genesis of the Article
1. The Labor Laws Project
The United States Department of Labor (the Department) has em-
barked on a study to review the nation's labor laws and collective
bargaining traditions and practices which may inhibit the improve-
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ments of labor-management relations. The study, colloquially known
as "The Laws Project," or "The Labor Laws Project," is designed to
assess whether the existing legal framework impedes many of the co-
operative efforts the Department publicly encourages. If so, the
study examines those laws to determine whether, through interpreta-
tion or modification, the laws can be made to support both the actual
components as well as the goals of labor-management cooperation
rather than to conflict with them. The Department published a pre-
liminary report in 1986 intended to increase awareness and support
for labor-management cooperation and to stimulate debate on the is-
sues encompassed by The Labor Laws Project.,
2. The Railway Labor Act Inquiry
The Department's Bureau of Labor-Management Relations and Co-
operative Programs (the Bureau) asked the author to appraise the
unique characteristics of the Railway Labor Act (RLA)2 pertaining to
the legal barriers to labor-management cooperation and also to in-
clude a history and description of the RLA, examine methods of
resolving stalemates under the RLA, and explain the National Medi-
ation Board (NMB) approach to problem solving. The author was
also asked to comment on the principles of representation under the
Act, enforcement of RLA duties by the courts, and the scope of bar-
gaining issues as they effect cooperation. This article is adapted from
the author's report to the Bureau.
The RLA is the oldest federal labor relations statute. Until the
early 1950s, most labor lawyers and labor relations professionals
thought the Act represented an ideal legal framework for encourag-
ing the peaceful resolution of employer-employee controversies.
However, the railroads' lost market share and technological innova-
tion in the railroad and airline industries required major adjustments
to the work structure in those industries. Due to these events, collec-
tive bargaining under the Act seemed to falter as an ideal problem
solving mechanism. The political nadir of the Act occurred in 1971
when the Nixon Administration proposed scrapping it entirely. More
recently, the RLA has received more favorable attention as a model
of labor relations law conceptually different from the National Labor
1. BUREAU OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, U.S. LA-
BOR LAW AND THE FUTURE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION (1986) (BLMR 104)
[hereinafter 1986 LABOR LAW REPORT].
2. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1982).
Relations Act (NLRA),3 and one which might encourage more inno-
vative and cooperative labor-management relationships.
B. Scope of the Article
1. Relation of Labor-Management Cooperation to Collective
Bargaining
Two possible approaches exist for evaluating the legal climate of
labor-management cooperation. One approach considers labor-man-
agement cooperation as a process separate and apart from collective
bargaining. The other considers such cooperation to be identical to
healthy collective bargaining. This article embraces the second ap-
proach based on the principles explained in this section.
Labor-management cooperation is a rather vague concept. Some
commentators and decision makers define it as management and em-
ployee representatives dealing with each other in a positive spirit,
taking into account the legitimate needs and aspirations of everyone
as they work together to solve problems, even if accommodating the
interests of opposing parties means sacrificing self-interests. 4 This
conception requires behavior that is not motivated by immediate self-
interest and departs substantially from past behavioral patterns in
either union or nonunion environments.
If the non-self-interested concept of cooperation could exist, collec-
tive bargaining, with its implicit potential for economic conflict,5
might be unnecessary. Indeed, some proposals to replace labor-man-
agement antagonism with a spirit of cooperation implicitly suggest
that labor-management cooperation should supplant collective bar-
gaining.6 The problem with this understanding of labor-management
cooperation is that it is fundamentally at odds with the forces under-
stood to drive a market economy. The essence of a market economy
is that individual firms, by pursuing their own relatively narrow self-
interest, produce an efficient allocation of resources in the aggre-
gate.7 If an enterprise is to suspend the pursuit of its self-interest in
managing its own work force, it is not clear how the basic assumption
for a market economy continues to be satisfied.
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-156 (1982).
4. See C. RANDLE & M. WORTMAN, CoLLEcTIvE BARGAINING 27-28 (1966) [herein-
after RANDLE & WORTMAN]; see, e.g., Detroit's Strange Bedfellows, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7,
1988, § 6 (Magazine), at 20. See generally I. SIEGEL & E. WEINBERG, LABOR-MANAGE-
MENT COOPERATION 5-28 (1982) [hereinafter SIEGEL & WEINBERG].
5. See NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 486 (1960).
6. See BUREAU OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, U.S.
LABOR LAW AND THE FUTURE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION, 1, 11-12, 15-16
(1987) (First Intermin Report, BLMR 113) [hereinafter 1987 LABOR LAW REPORT]
(comments of Donald R. Sazama and J. Bruce Johnston).
7. See A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS (1863).
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A more realistic understanding of labor-management cooperation
can be obtained by envisioning it as a reshaping of the forces of self-
interest and the economic power to injure which have traditionally
driven collective bargaining. Such an understanding is close to the
traditional ideas of free collective bargaining.S According to this con-
cept, employee and management representatives engage in mutual
problem solving while pursuing their somewhat disparate self-inter-
ests in light of both parties' capacity to impose injury on the other
through economic pressure.9 This understanding of labor-manage-
ment cooperation suggests that opportunities for asserting economic
pressure and pursuing litigation should be re-evaluated in order to
give the institutions of collective bargaining a better problem solving
orientation.
This approach to labor-management cooperation discourages focus-
ing narrowly on particular legal, principles which restrict manage-
ment from aiding union representatives or from sponsoring certain
kinds of employee representation arrangements. Rather, it encour-
ages considering the full range of legal rights and obligations that
shape collective bargaining.
2. Judging Criteria for Collective Bargaining
Defining labor-management cooperation in the collective bargain-
ing context is further complicated by lack of agreement on the crite-
ria used to judge the success of collective bargaining. Management
commentators tend to judge collective bargaining by its ability to ac-
commodate competitive forces. 10 Union commentators, however,
tend to judge collective bargaining by its effectiveness in protecting
and improving the economic and psychological welfare of employ-
ees.'X The competitive view emphasizes the moderation or reduction
of labor costs,' 2 whereas the employee welfare view emphasizes lim-
iting competition in the labor markets.13
8. See T. KOCHAN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 14, 26
(1980) (free collective bargaining described as negotiations without outside interven-
tion). See generally RANDLE & WORTMAN, supra note 4, at 9-11 (discussing characteris-
tics of collective bargaining).
9. See Moberly, New Directions in Worker Participation and Collective Bargain-
ing, 87 W. VA. L. REV. 765 (1985) (arguing that collective bargaining, freed of artificial
legal restrictions, could accomplish most types of labor-management cooperation).
10. RANDLE & WORTMAN, supra note 4, at 11-13.
11. Id. at 12-13.
12. Id. at 17, 33.
13. Id at 16; see W. GOULD, JAPAN'S RESHAPING OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 1
(1984).
Management's competitive view accepts the premise that market
forces are desirable. Market forces require that an enterprise be-
come more efficient over time in order to meet low cost challenges
from other firms in the same industry and from firms in other indus-
tries offering substitute products or services.14 Meeting these com-
petitive challenges requires the adjustment of labor costs, usually
downward, by means of improved productivity or actual reductions in
employee compensation.' 5 Healthy collective bargaining, according
to this view, responds to product market competition by permitting
employers to restructure the work force, improve labor productivity
by capital investment in new technology, and hold wage levels to
those existing in relevant external labor markets.16 This view en-
courages concessionary or accommodation bargaining. Such bargain-
ing occurs when employee representatives agree to change work
rules or moderate wage and benefit demands in exchange for sharing
power or for other rights considered of value to union institutions or
rank-and-file employees which do not impose substantial economic
costs on employers.17
The employee welfare view acknowledges the existence of competi-
tive pressures on enterprises, but seeks to limit the human costs of
such competition.' 8 Adherents to this view stress that human costs
can be limited by restricting the competition itself or by compensat-
ing employees for the harmful effects of that competition. Threats to
enterprise viability-translating into threats to employee security-
from intra-industry competition should be met by limiting labor cost
competition within an industry, either by governmentally imposed
minimum labor standards,19 by economic regulation of rates of entry
and exit, or by industry-wide collective bargaining which standard-
izes work rules and wage and benefit levels.20 Threats to enterprise
viability from inter-industry competition should be met by expanding
14. See C. COLE, MICROECONOMICs: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 231 (1973).
15. Id.
16. W. MIERNYK, THE ECONOMICS OF LABOR AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 228
(1965).
17. See, e.g., Moberly, supra note 9, at 766-67 (discussing workers as members of
company boards of directors).
18. See Rehmus, Collective Bargaining and Technological Change on American
Railroads, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN AMERICAN
TRANSPORTATION 85, 87-88 (1971) [hereinafter Rehmus, Collective Bargaining] (techno-
logical advances should not be borne solely by workers).
19. See Remarks by R. L. Crandall, Chairman and President, American Airlines,
Inc., before the Airline Industrial Relations Conference (June 17, 1987) (proposing that
government set floor for medical insurance, pension benefits and other issues affecting
airline labor costs).
20. See Levinson, Collective Bargaining and Technological Cange in the Truck-
ing Industry, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN AMERICAN
TRANSPORTATION, sitpra note 18, at 18-24 [hereinafter Levinson, Collective Bargaining]
(evolution of national bargaining in trucking industry to limit inter-city competition).
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the scope of collective bargaining to those competing industries or by
government intervention to control competitive threats from indus-
tries providing substitute goods or services. For example, rail indus-
try employee groups have an economic incentive to oppose coal
slurry pipelines which are able to divert coal traffic from railroads. 21
Obviously, the competitive and employee welfare views are in op-
position, the former emphasizing meeting the competition, the latter
emphasizing limiting it. The two views are not irreconcilable, how-
ever. Both require frank and accurate identification of the competi-
tive threats to a particular employer. Both acknowledge the need for
some response to the threats. Both allow for a wide variety of collec-
tively bargained for responses.
Labor-management cooperation in the context of collective bar-
gaining is desirable to increase managerial and employee control over
their enterprise's economic future. Absent this cooperation, firms
will fail to survive in a market economy with resultant loss of em-
ployment opportunities. Labor-management cooperation also serves
the public interest because without it, consumer benefits from effi-
cient economic production will be lost. Economic disruption due to
strikes and bankruptcies can also proliferate as employee and en-
trepreneurial interests conflict with each other over their shares of a
declining economic pie.
Perhaps the best criterion for judging collective bargaining is the
one suggested by Professor Thomas Kochan:
Since some of the goals of the major actors-workers, unions, employers,
and the public--conflict, it is not possible to specify a single overriding effec-
tiveness criterion. Instead we need to examine collective bargaining from the
standpoint of each of the actors and then recognize that collective bargaining
implies a need to balance a number of conflicting goals.
2 2
3. Overview of the Article
This article begins with an overview of the legal, economic, and
political environment surrounding collective bargaining in the rail-
road and airline industries. It then identifies basic policy options for
the role the law plays in promoting effective labor relations, evaluat-
ing ten specific criticisms of the RLA and the bargaining traditions
spawned by the Act. This article comes to the following conclusions:
(1) competing criteria exist for evaluating the success of labor-man-
agement cooperation; (2) collective bargaining provides the best set of
21. See generally In re Burlington N., Inc., 822 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1987).
22. T. KOCHAN, supra note 8, at 26 (emphasis added).
guidelines for promoting labor-management cooperation; (3) collec-
tive bargaining is not primarily a creature of law; (4) economic pres-
sure is an essential force to make collective bargaining work; (5)
collective bargaining agreements should be enforceable, even when
addressing novel subjects or involving parties beyond the traditional
definitions of an employer or employee representative; and (6) labor
law should not remove subjects from the bargaining table, either by
making them "nonmandatory" or by setting substantive terms of em-
ployment directly.
The article separately considers whether labor protection helps or
hurts labor-management cooperation and concludes that deregulation
of the airline and railroad industries has strengthened collective bar-
gaining. However, the viability of deregulation depends on the effec-
tiveness of collective bargaining in addressing employee concerns.
Although the issues in this article are not new,23 conditions in the
railroad and airline industries have changed, especially since deregu-
lation. Overall, this article concludes that few amendments to the
RLA are necessary, but that changing attitudes of the government
would improve the administration of the Act.
II. LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
A. Industry Structures and Economics
The economics of the railroad and airline industries differ in some
ways but are similar in others. The differences relate to the much
larger economic barriers to entry in the railroad industry and very
low marginal costs24 compared with relatively low economic barriers
to entry in the airline industry and intermediate marginal costs. 25
For example, it costs a great deal to build a new railroad system, but
to change a route, one must build another line of railroad.26 Once a
railroad is built, however, carrying one more car on a train costs little
23. Many of these same issues have been extensively addressed in major compen-
dia of papers and in symposia on issues including accommodating technological change
in transportation industries as well as other transportation labor issues. See generally
NATIONAL MEDIATION BD., THE NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD AT 50 (C. Rehmus ed.
1984) [hereinafter THE NMB AT 50]; NATIONAL MEDIATION BD., THE RAILWAY LABOR
ACT AT FIFTY, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE RAILROAD AND AIRLINE INDUSTRIES (C.
Rehmus ed. 1976) [hereinafter THE RLA AT FIFTY]; Levinson, Collective Bargaining,
supra note 20; Rehmus, Collective Bargaining, supra note 18.
24. Rehmus, Collective Bargaining, supra note 18, at 92.
25. G. Zeh, The Future of the Craft Structure (unpublished report presented at
the Villanova Law School Center for Continuing Legal Education during a symposium
entitled Transportation Issues for the 1980s held on May 17-18, 1982). See generally J.
MEYER, M. PECK, J. STENASON & C. ZWICK, THE ECONOMICS OF COMPETITION IN THE
TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY 133-44 (1959) [hereinafter MEYER & PECK].
26. Of course, trains can be routed in different ways over an existing rail network
with little capital investment necessitated by the rerouting.
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extra since fuel and labor costs are spread over scores of cars in a sin-
gle train.
The expenses of starting an airline include the costs of buying or
renting the airplanes. These costs are much lower than the cost of
building a railroad.27 Once obtained, it costs virtually nothing to fly
an airplane to one city as opposed to another over comparable dis-
tances. The costs of flying another flight or running one more train
are equivalent, approximating modest fuel and labor costs. 28 Differ-
ences between passenger and freight characteristics make quantita-
tive comparisons between the two industries difficult, but it seems
reasonable to conclude that marginal costs are low relative to fixed
costs in both industries, though fixed costs are much higher in the
railroad industry than in the airline industry. In other words, rail-
roads have more of the characteristics of a natural monopoly than
airlines.29
In both industries, the relatively high fixed costs compared with
low marginal costs tend to produce an unstable rate structure, be-
cause all carriers have an incentive to reduce rates at the margin to
attract additional business.3 0 The possibility of an unstable rate
structure encourages government regulation, keeping rates high and
ensuring that all carriers earn compensatory rates of return.31 How-
ever, the sizeable economic barriers to entry in the railroad industry
create the possibility of monopolies in some markets. Monopolistic
control of a market leads to inflated rate structures. To protect cus-
tomers from such monopolistic abuse, the government may regulate
rates the railroad industry charges. Thus, the government may sup-
27. A small commuter plane costs approximately $300,000 and a Boeing 737 costs
approximately $5 million. Ten years ago, the date of the most recent track building,
Burlington Northern Railroad built a 100-mile extension to serve coal fields in Wyo-
ming. The cost was approximately $100 million for the track and signal system.
28. Carrying one more passenger in an empty seat costs little more. Arguably,
this is the airline equivalent of adding a car to a train and is the more appropriate mea-
sure of marginal cost.
29. A natural monopoly is an industry characterized by high threshold capital re-
quirements and virtually unlimited economies of scale. See Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351-52 & n.8 (1974).
30. Dempsey, Transportation Deregulation-On a Collision Course?, 13 TRANSP.
L.J. 329, 334-35 (1984) [hereinafter Dempsey, Collision Course]; see R. CAVES, AMERI-
CAN INDUSTRY: STRUCTURE, CONDUCT, PERFORMANCE 72 (1964); P. DEMPSEY & W.
THOMS, LAW AND ECONOMIC REGULATION IN TRANSPORTATION 8 (1986) (hereinafter
DEMPSEY & THOMS]. See generally MEYER & PECK, supra note 25.
31. Dempsey, Collision Course, supra note 30, at 331-39, 356; see R. CAVES, supra
note 30, at 72; DEMPSEY & THOMS, supra note 30, at 12-14, 26. See generally MEYER &
PECK, supra note 25.
port higher rates due to the instability of the industry's rate struc-
ture, but it also may place a ceiling on such rates in a monopolistic
market.32
Both railroad and airline service are important to a community's
infrastructure. Accordingly, there is often strong political pressure
for government regulation ensuring adequate railroad and airline ser-
vice.33 Because service in some communities is not profitable, these
political demands lead to regulations requiring carriers to cross subsi-
dize unprofitable but mandated services with more profitable services
in other markets.3 4 In order for a cross subsidization regulatory pol-
icy to work, the regulating agency must provide the carrier some de-
gree of protection in its profitable markets in order to produce the
supernormal profit levels needed to subsidize the unprofitable mar-
kets served.3 5 All of these factors combined tend to justify extensive
government regulation of rate structures and conditions of market
entry and exit.
Despite these proregulation forces, Congress has been under pres-
sure since the mid 1970s to deregulate both the railroad and airline
industries significantly. Deregulation has profoundly impacted the
structure in both industries. For instance, in the railroad industry,
nearly 200 short-line and regional railroads have come into existence
since deregulation, operating 13,000 miles of rail lines and employing
4000 workers.36
Unfortunately, almost no attention was paid to the impact of dereg-
ulation on labor markets and the institutions of collective bargaining
during the deregulation phase.3 7 Unions favor economic regulation
because it restricts product market competition which often results
in layoffs or reductions in wage and benefit levels.38 Furthermore,
the existence of comprehensive regulation provides trade unions nu-
merous opportunities to seek political intervention designed to
change the balance of power in collective bargaining, or to pursue
32. Compare Western Coal Traffic League v. United States, 719 F.2d 772, 778 (5th
Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1110 (1984) (ICC must regulate rates where
no effective competition exists) with Bessemer & L.E.R.R. v. ICC, 691 F.2d 1104, 1112
(3d Cir. 1982) (ICC should analyze the level of revenue carriers needed to earn a com-
pensatory rate of return).
33. Dempsey, Collision Course, supra note 30, at 331-39; see DEMPSEY & THOMS,
supra note 30, at 12-14.
34. IA.
35. Id.
36. See Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 855 F.2d
1277 (7th Cir. 1988) (reviewing short-line phenomenon since the enactment of rail de-
regulation legislation).
37. D. LIPSKY & C. DONN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 144
(1987) [hereinafter LIPSKY & DONN] (citing Dunlop, Trends and Issues in Labor Rela-
tions in the Transport Sector, TRANSP. RES. NEWS 1, 1-8 (May-June 1985)).
38. LIPSKY & DONN, supra note 37, at 149; Dempsey, Collision Course, supra note
30, at 336-37.
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objectives through regulation not otherwise obtainable through col-
lective bargaining.39
B. Industrial Relations Environment
Collective bargaining in the railroad industry predates the develop-
ment of labor law. Railroads were this country's first large scale in-
dustrial enterprise4o and were almost completely unionized shortly
after the first World War. Railroad labor law was developed to re-
flect the realistic collective bargaining institutions already in place.41
Since the mid-1920s, railroad management resistance to collective
bargaining has been modest and sporadic.42 Collective bargaining has
been accepted as the appropriate means for reconciling an enter-
prise's need to innovate with its employees' desires for economic se-
curity and improved standards of living. Potentially extreme
positions taken by carriers have been muted by the long tradition of
industry-wide bargaining by employers over major economic issues.43
However, railroad unions generally have negotiated separately with
the industry-wide bargaining conferences composed of several
carriers.44
For the last seventy years, collective bargaining has accommodated
the substantial shrinkage of the railroad industry as well as techno-
logical revolutions in virtually every aspect of railroad operations.
The attitudes of labor and management have alternated between
high levels of cooperation, especially in the legislative arena,45 and
extreme feelings of bitterness.46
39. See Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R., 845 F.2d 420,
429-30 (3d Cir. 1988); see also infra notes 382-89 and accompanying text (discussing
how deregulation impacts collective bargaining).
40. See A. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN BUSINESS 79 (1977).
41. See Ruby v. American Airlines, Inc., 323 F.2d 248, 256 (2d Cir. 1963), cert de-
nied, 376 U.S. 913 (1964). In "the railroad industry... strong unions and management
had become used to dealing with each other." Id.
42. Id.
43. But see Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 383 F.2d
225 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (crew consist issue must be negotiated on carrier-by-carrier basis
rather than on industry-wide one, given history of bargaining in railroad industry).
44. Rehmus, Evolution of Legislation Affecting Collective Bargaining in the Rail-
road and Airline Industries, in THE RLA AT FiFry, supra note 23, at 16-17.
45. See, e.g., The Northeast Rail Service Act of 1981, contained in The Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357 (1981). See generally
Rehmus, Collective Bargaining, supra note 26, at 123-32.
46. See, e.g., United States v. Florida E.C. Ry., 7 Fed. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 540,
7 Emp. Prac. Dec. 9218 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 1974) (case involved a strike lasting over
10 years).
Airline industrial relations are more pluralistic than in the railroad
industry. Collective bargaining began early in the relatively short his-
tory of the airline industry. The first collective bargaining agreement
was signed between American Airlines and the Air Line Pilots Asso-
ciation (ALPA) in 1939.47 Employers manifested little resistance to
dealing with unions respecting some groups of employees, especially
pilots and flight attendants.48 Airline management has been more
resistant to collective bargaining, however, in the clerical and mainte-
nance areas.4 9 Further, single carrier bargaining prevails in the air-
line industry because of strong opposition to multi-carrier bargaining
by some airlines and also by most airline unions.50 Accommodating
technological change has been a problem, though, especially during
the transition to jet aircraft. 51
At least some of the employer acquiescence to collective bargaining
in both industries can be explained by the inherent vulnerability of a
transportation enterprise to strike pressure since its product cannot
be stockpiled. Furthermore, the integrated nature of its operations
makes it difficult to respond to a localized strike by diverting produc-
tion to other facilities.52
In both the railroad and airline industries, political action by em-
ployee groups has been as important a feature of the industrial rela-
tions system as collective bargaining. In the early years of the airline
industry, the ALPA concentrated its political efforts on legislative ac-
tivity almost to the exclusion of collective bargaining.5 3 Even before
the RLA was applied to the airline industry, the ALPA induced the
National Labor Board, an agency created by the National Industrial
Recovery Act, to impose a pilot compensation formula on air carri-
ers.5 4 Later, the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 required compliance
with this formula.55 Railroad labor groups have been similarly effec-
47. See Kahn, Labor-Management Relations in the Airline Industry, in THE RLA
AT FIFTY, supra note 23, at 97, 104. The ALPA was the first effective airline labor or-
ganization. See generally G. HOPKINS, THE AIRLINE PILOTS: A STUDY IN ELITE UNIONI-
ZATION (1971).
48. See Kahn, supra note 47, at 97, 108-09 (ALPA has bargained for virtually all
pilots since 1942 and mechanics covered by collective agreements since 1942).
49. See, e.g., Southwest Airlines Co., 13 N.M.B. 126-2741 (1986) (case no. R-5596);
Eastern Air Lines, Inc. 13 N.M.B. 312-14 (1986) (case no. R-5627). See generally LIPSKY
& DONN, supra note 37, at 168-70 (reservation and ticket agents as well as clerical em-
ployees are the least unionized of any group in the airline industry).
50. See Kahn, supra note 47, at 110 (noting party opposition to multi-carrier bar-
gaining and explaining that the only major exception was a machinist union dispute
with five carriers in 1966).
51. See Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Flight Eng'rs Int'l Ass'n., 306 F.2d
840, 843-45 (2d Cir. 1962) (detailing history of flight engineer disputes).
52. See LIPSKY & DONN, supra note 37, at 139.
53. See Kahn, supra note 47, at 104.
54. Id. at 101.
55. See Kahn, supra note 47, at 103.
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tive in legislative forums. In the Emergency Railroad Transportation
Act of 1933, they successfully persuaded Congress to freeze railroad
industry employment and to mandate labor protection as a condition
of regulatory approvals of changes in industry structure.56 In addi-
tion, railway labor groups persuaded state legislatures to impose a va-
riety of crew size and railroad equipment requirements on rail
carriers.5 7
The steady decline of railroad market share, maturation of the air-
line industry, and deregulation of both industries present new chal-
lenges and new opportunities for collective bargaining. The degree of
unionization in the railroad industry has declined slightly, especially
in light of the development of new "short-line" railroads with low de-
grees of union representation which have taken over lines formerly
operated by larger railroads58 Unionized airlines face major compet-
itive threats from the rapidly growing nonunion airlines which have
acquired major shares of almost every market.5 9 Responding to these
challenges and opportunities requires high levels of adaptability by
collective bargaining institutions.
C. The Legal Environment
Railroads and airlines are covered by the RLA6O rather than by the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).61 The RLA imposes more
detailed dispute resolution procedures than the NLRA,62 but other-
wise provides a less elaborate legal framework for adjusting claims of
56. Emergency Railroad Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 91-68, § 7(b), 48 Stat. 211,
214 (1933); see infra notes 315-81 and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Norwood, 283 U.S. 249 (1931) (upholding constitu-
tionality of Arkansas full-crew law); Perritt, Ask and Ye Shall Receive: The Legislative
Response to the Northeast Rail Crisis, 28 VILL. L. REV. 271, 287 (1983) (discussing state
full-crew and train-length legislation).
58. See Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 855 F.2d
1277, 1278-86 (noting opposition of rail labor to shortline acquisition in the absence of
standard labor protection).
59. See LiPsKY & DONN, supra note 37, at 142-47; Dempsey, Collision Course,
supra note 30, at 350-51; Comment, Deregulation in the Airline Industry: Toward a
New Judicial Interpretation of the Railway Labor Act, 80 NW. U.L. REV. 1003, 1004
(1986) (finding low cost carriers to hamper union success in gaining concessions).
60. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163, 181-188 (1986).
61. Section 2 of the NLRA excludes "any person subject to the Railway Labor
Act" from the definition of employer. 29 U.S.C. § 142 (1982). Section 3 excludes "any
individual employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act" from the defi-
nition of employee. Id. § 143; see Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Ter-
minal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 376 (1969).
62. For ease in exposition, this article refers to the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) and the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) collectively as the NLRA.
statutory right.6 3 The RLA requires that rights or grievance disputes
be submitted to "adjustment boards," essentially arbitration tribu-
nals, for final and binding resolution.6 4 In the railroad industry, em-
ployment rights disputes can be submitted either to adjustment
boards created through collective bargaining or to a permanent Na-
tional Railroad Adjustment Board.65 In the airline industry, carriers
and employee representatives are obligated to create adjustment
boards through collective bargaining for resolution of such rights
disputes.66
The RLA also provides an extensive mechanism for resolving in-
terest disputes.6 7 Such disputes must be submitted for an extended
period of negotiation, followed by mediation under the auspices of
the NMB.68 These steps are followed by an optional fact finding pro-
cess at the discretion of the Mediation Board and the President,69 fol-
lowed frequently by an ad hoc Presidential or congressional
intervention.70 During this lengthy process, characterized by the
Supreme Court as "virtually endless,"71 carriers are precluded from
changing the status quo and employees are precluded from striking.
Finally, the RLA provides for certification of employee representa-
tives through election units defined by the NMB.72
Apart from the RLA, there is a long history of governmentally im-
posed labor protection in both industries. While the RLA leaves the
substantive terms and conditions of employment to be decided
through private negotiation, labor protection requirements also im-
pose certain terms of employment and freeze other collectively bar-
gained for terms.73
D. History of the RLA
Legislation dealing with railroad labor disputes was the first fed-
eral labor legislation to address collective bargaining.74 The statutory
63. See iqfra notes 114-35 and accompanying text.
64. 45 U.S.C. §§ 153(i), 184-185 (1982). Rights or grievance disputes involve the ap-
plication of existing agreements.
65. 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1982).
66. See IAM v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682, 686 (1963) (citing 45 U.S.C.
§ 184).
67. Interest disputes involve the establishment of new terms and conditions of
employment.
68. 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1982).
69. Id. § 160.
70. See generally H. PERRITT, LABOR INJUNCTIONS § 13.9 (1986).
71. Burlington N.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, 481 U.S.
429 (1987).
72. 45 U.S.C. § 152(9) (1982).
73. See infra notes 315-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of labor protec-
tion issues.
74. The first federal labor legislation of any type was the statute regulating
merchant seaman working conditions, enacted by the first Congress. See Act for the
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evolution began in 1888, with legislation providing for federally
funded arbitration of disputes if both parties consented. 75 The legis-
lation also provided for temporary fact-finding commissions to ex-
amine "the causes of the controversy, the conditions accompanying
[it], and the best means for adjusting it."76 The theory of this legisla-
tion was to provide a mechanism for focusing public opinion on rail-
road labor disputes; compulsory settlement procedures were
rejected.77 The fact-finding provisions of the 1888 legislation were
used only once, whereas its arbitration provisions were never ap-
plied.78 Its basic principles, however, have been retained in all subse-
quent railroad legislation.
The Erdman Act of 189879 replaced the 1888 Arbitration Act by ad-
ding mediation and conciliation to the fact-finding processes and vol-
untary arbitration to the settlement processes.80 The Erdman Act
expressly provided that an arbitration award was judicially enforcea-
ble and limited the right of employers or employees to engage in eco-
nomic action during the pendency of arbitration proceedings, or for a
fixed period of time after an award was entered.S1
The Newlands Act of 191382 followed the same approach as the
Erdman Act, adding a Board of Mediation and Conciliation to con-
duct the mediation and conciliation stages.8 3 The Board's express
mandate was to attempt inducing the parties to settle their disputes
through arbitration if mediation proved unsuccessful.8 4 The Newl-
ands Act, however, unlike the Erdman Act,8 5 contained no express
provision limiting resort to economic action while the arbitration ma-
chinery was being engaged.
Government and Regulation of Seamen in the Merchants Service, ch. 29, 1 Stat. 131
(1790).
75. Arbitration Act, ch. 1063, § 5, 25 Stat. 502 (1888).
76. Id. § 6, 25 Stat. 503.
77. 19 CONG. REC. 3098 (1888).
78. See Rehmus, supra note 44, at 4.
79. Ch. 370, 30 Stat. 424 (1898).
80. Id. §§ 2-3, 30 Stat. 425.
81. Id. § 7, 30 Stat. 427. In assessing the significance of the early legislation, it is
important to understand that the distinction between interest arbitration and griev-
ance arbitration emerged only later, after The Transportation Act of 1920 drew the dis-
tinction. Therefore, the type of arbitration envisioned by the 1888 and 1898 statutes
encompassed both types of disputes.
82. Ch. 6, 38 Stat. 103-08 (1913).
83. Id. § 2, 38 Stat. 104 (1913).
84. Id.
85. Ch. 370, § 7, 30 Stat. 427 (1898).
The Transportation Act of 1920,86 providing for a return to private
control of the railroads after they were controlled by the federal gov-
ernment during World War I, contained comprehensive provisions
dealing with labor disputes.87 The Act departed from previous legis-
lation in two important ways. First, it established a distinction be-
tween rights or grievance disputes (disputes over the application of
existing agreements), and interest disputes (disputes over the estab-
lishment of new terms and conditions of employment).88 This dichot-
omy continues to be reflected in modern legislation.8 9 Second, it
provided for compulsory determination of appropriate wage levels by
the government. 90 This second difference, and the determination by
the Supreme Court that the decisions of the Railroad Labor Board
were not enforceable, 91 led to a breakdown of the Act's machinery.
In 1926, Congress enacted the RLA with virtually no changes from
a legislative proposal agreed upon between rail labor groups and rail
management to replace the Transportation Act of 1920.92 The RLA
amalgamated procedures originating in earlier statutes and continued
the distinction between "major" and "minor" disputes.93 Minor dis-
putes were to be arbitrated by adjustment boards voluntarily estab-
lished by the parties.94 The Railroad Labor Board was abolished,95
and the permanent Board of Mediation was established with jurisdic-
tion over minor disputes not resolved by an adjustment board; dis-
putes over changes in rates of pay, rules, or working conditions; and
"other dispute(s)."96 The pattern established by the 1913 Act was fol-
lowed, in that the Mediation Board was to attempt to induce the par-
ties to submit disputes not resolved by mediation to arbitration.97
The pattern of the 1888 Arbitration Act was followed by the RLA in
that disputes not resolved by agreement or by mediation, and not
submitted to arbitration, could be subjected to fact-finding processes
of an emergency board created by the President of the United
86. Ch. 91, 41 Stat. 456-99 (1920) (current version codified as amended in scattered
sections of 45 U.S.C. and 49 U.S.C.).
87. Id, §§ 303-307, 41 Stat. 469-71.
88. Compare ch. 91, § 303, 41 Stat. 469-70 with ch. 91, § 307(b), 41 Stat. 470-71.
89. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 155-157 (1982); see also Burlington N.R.R. v. Brotherhood
of Maintenance of Way Employees, 481 U.S. 429 (1987).
90. Ch. 91, § 307(b), 41 Stat. 471.
91. See Pennsylvania R.R. v. United States R.R. Labor Bd., 261 U.S. 72, 84 (1923).
92. Compare Hearings on S. 2306 Before the Senate Comm. on Interstate Com-
merce, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1926) [hereinafter Senate Hearings] with Railway La-
bor Act, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1982)).
93. The Supreme Court, not Congress, created the labels "major" and "minor,"
but the RLA created two distinct processes for the two different types of disputes. See
Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723-24 (1945).
94. Ch. 347, § 3, 44 Stat. 578 (1926).
95. Id § 14, 44 Stat. 587.
96. Id. §§ 4-5, 44 Stat. 579-82.
97. Id, § 5(b), 44 Stat. 580.
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States.98 The tone of the hearings and the committee reports preced-
ing the RLA's enactment make it clear that the purpose of the legis-
lation was to end railroad strikes by providing a "safety valve" for
employee discontent and thus reducing the perceived need to
strike.99
In 1934, Congress amended the RLA to protect employees' rights to
organize and to strengthen the mechanisms for resolving minor dis-
putes.1 00 A National Railroad Adjustment Board was established to
adjudicate minor disputes not determinable by adjustment boards
voluntarily established by the parties.101 Congress left substantially
unchanged the provisions of the RLA regarding mediation, voluntary
arbitration, and emergency board fact-finding, except that the Board
of Mediation was renamed the "National Mediation Board" and
divested of jurisdiction over minor disputes.10 2
'The RLA was amended again in 1936103 to include airlines within
its coverage. The 1936 amendments made all of the RLA's basic pro-
visions applicable to airlines, except for grievance arbitration provi-
sions of the Act.104 Airlines and employee representatives were
obligated to establish adjustment boards to settle grievances and
other contract interpretation questions. 05 The airline industry did
not oppose the coverage of airlines under the RLA since it was hoped
that collective bargaining could replace government mandated pay
formulas.OG
Amendments to the RLA enacted in 1951 authorized union secur-
98. Id § 10, 44 Stat. 586-87 (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. § 160 (1982)).
99. Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 9, 16-17, 35; Hearings on H.R. Rep. No. 328
Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Railway Labor Dis-
putes, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926).
100. Railway Labor Act, ch. 691, 48 Stat. 1185 (1934) (codified as amended at 45
U.S.C. §§ 151-161 (1982)); see Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. St. Louis S.W. Ry.,
757 F.2d 656, 659 (5th Cir. 1985) (characterizing nature of 1934 political compromise).
101. See H.R. Rep. No. 1944, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1934).
102. See id. at 11-12.
103. Act of Apr. 10, 1936, ch. 166, 49 Stat. 1189 (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C.
§ 181 (1982)).
104. See 45 U.S.C. § 181 (1982) (making all provisions of 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-152, 154-
163 applicable to "common carriers by air engaged in interstate and foreign com-
merce"). The omitted section 153 of title 45 is section 3 of the RLA.
105. 45 U.S.C. § 184 (1982); see also IAM v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682
(1963). Section 205 of the 1936 Amendments, 45 U.S.C. § 185 (1982), authorizes the
NMB to establish a National Air Transport Adjustment Board, but this authority has
not been exercised.
106. Kahn, Collective Bargaining on the Airline Flight Deck, in COLLECTIVE BAR-
GAINING AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN AMERICAN TRANSPORTATION 421, 466 (1971)
[hereinafter Kahn, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING]; see Kahn, supra note 47, at 102.
ity and dues checkoff agreements.10 7 Further amendments in 1966
established government funded adjustment boards for the railroad
industry colloquially called "public law boards."10s The Northeast
Rail Service Act of 1981109 added a new section to the RLA11 0 estab-
lishing a special emergency board procedure for commuter rail dis-
putes. During the early 1970s, the Nixon Administration tried
unsuccessfully to persuade Congress to provide a single set of proce-
dures for dealing with emergency disputes in the transportation in-
dustry.111 However, the administration did implement policies
reforming rail industry bargaining structure1 1 2 which decreased the
readiness of the President to appoint emergency boards, especially in
single-carrier disputes.11a
E. Differences Between the RLA and the NLRA
The RLA applies exclusively to the railroad and airline industries
and represents a less detailed scheme of regulation than the NLRA.
Although the RLA requires dispute resolution procedures which are
only voluntary under the NLRA, the RLA leaves the details of the
collective bargaining process and its results mostly to private decision
makers, influenced only by historical customs and practices. The
NLRA in contrast, seeks to define legal rights, obligations, and privi-
leges in detail, both by statutory language and by detailed administra-
tive agency adjudication.
The RLA, like the NLRA, provides for collective bargaining
through exclusive employee representatives and authorizes a federal
agency to designate exclusive representatives for employee election
units.1 4 The RLA, however, does not describe in detail the rights
107. Act of Jan. 10, 1951, ch. 1220, 64 Stat. 1238 (adding paragraph eleven to section
2); see 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1982).
108. Act of June 20, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-456, 80 Stat. 208 (amending 45 U.S.C. § 153
(1982)). The legislative history of the 1966 amendments is set forth in 1966 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2285.
109. 95 Stat. 681 (1981).
110. 5 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982).
111. See S. 560, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R. 3596, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
112. Former Secretary of Labor W.J. Usery, Jr. generally is given credit for pro-
moting needed reforms in bargaining structure through his extraordinary skills as a
mediator. Cf. Cullen, Emergency Boards Under the Railway Labor Act, in THE RLA
AT FIFrY, supra note 23, at 151, 174-76; see also Perritt, supra note 57, at 290-93
(describing bargaining structure problems and reforms).
113. This policy of less intervention is credited to then Secretary of Labor George
P. Shultz. See Cullen, supra note 112, at 174.
114. The term "election unit" is used instead of the more common "bargaining
unit" to reflect more accurately the function of such units. Bargaining may take place
with respect to groups of employees broader or narrower than the unit through which
the representative has been selected. See UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, THE STRUCTURE OF
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (A. Weber ed. 1961); T. KOCHAN, supra note 8, at 86-100 (dis-
tinguishing election units and negotiation units).
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and obligations of the parties to collective bargaining, nor does it
mention "unfair labor practices." 1 5 Moreover, the RLA, unlike the
NLRA, does not invest an administrative agency with general powers
to interpret and to administer its provisions.11 6 Rather, the federal
courts in private civil actions have responsibility to interpret the vari-
ous obligations and rights specified in the RLA.117
The federal courts, therefore, have a much greater role in enforc-
ing the provisions of the RLA rather than the NLRA, mainly
through injunctive remedies. Injunctions against employer or em-
ployee conduct are available to private parties1 i 8 upon their showing
that a duty imposed by the RLA has been violated or that the con-
duct in question interferes with one of its processes. Early in the his-
tory of the RLA, the courts determined that the duties imposed by
the Act were judicially enforceable against employers.11 9 Beginning
in 1957, the courts began holding that employee and union duties
under the RLA could be enforced, and the jurisdiction of RLA dis-
pute resolution processes could be protected 2o by injunctions against
115. For a comparison of the NLRA and the RLA, see generally Arouca & Perritt,
Transportation Labor Regulation: Is the Railway Labor Act or the National Labor Re-
lations Act the Better Statutory Vehicle?, 36 LAB. L.J. 145 (1985); Arouca & Perritt,
Transportation Labor Law and Policy for a Deregulated Industry, 1 LAB. LAW. 617
(1985) [hereinafter Arouca & Perritt, Transportation Labor Law].
116. See Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 402 U.S. 570 (1971). Judge
Friendly has explained that the RLA, covering an industry in which "strong unions
and management had become used to dealing with each other," naturally stresses me-
diation, while the NLRA stresses administrative adjudication because it covers busi-
nesses of "every size and description, many with a history of strong anti-union bias and
with ample opportunity to [use] strong-arm tactics." Ruby v. American Airlines, Inc.,
323 F.2d 248, 256 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 913 (1964).
117. Compare Chicago & NW. Ry., 402 U.S. at 581 (approving injunction against
strike by union failing to pursue major dispute processes in good faith) with Burling-
ton N.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, 481 U.S. 429, 448 (1987)
(declining to imply authority to enjoin secondary picketing).
118. Under the NLRA, injunctions are available to private parties only to enforce
collective bargaining agreements. Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International
Longshoremens Ass'n, 457 U.S. 702, 708 (1982). In other circumstances, the NLRB is
authorized to obtain injunctions. See H. PERRITT, supra note 70, §§ 7.6 -.9.
119. Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Board of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 565-66 (1930)
(RLA duties are judicially enforceable in suit to enjoin carrier interference with em-
ployee choice of representative); Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n, 300 U.S. 515, 549-50
(1937) (injunction forcing employer to comply with RLA duty to bargain).
120. Judge Friendly has suggested that injunctions are permitted by the Norris-La-
Guardia Act only when (1) the "unlawful acts" required by section 7 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act can be shown by violation of some express duty imposed by the RLA;
or (2) when the injunction is necessary to protect RLA processes. See Chicago, R.I. &
Pac. R.R. v. Switchmen's Union, 292 F.2d 61, 71 (2d Cir. 1961). See generaly Norris-
LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-113 (1982); H. PERRIr, supra note 70, §§ 3.1 -.20.
concerted employee action. Courts "enjoin virtually all concerted em-
ployee action over grievance (minor) disputes, and enjoin concerted
action over interest (major) disputes unless the major dispute resolu-
tion processes of the RLA have been exhausted."1 21
The RLA is more specific than the NLRA regarding dispute reso-
lution. The RLA requires submitting grievance disputes to arbitra-
tion rather than leaving them to labor and management parties to
decide how to resolve such disputes.12 2 The grievance arbitration
provisions of the Act require submitting grievances involving railroad
employees to arbitration panels called adjustment boards,123 as well
as requiring airlines and their employees to establish adjustment
boards to hear employee grievances. 124
The RLA also provides a more detailed system for handling inter-
est disputes than does the NLRA. Such disputes are subject to a
multiple phase process which the Supreme Court has labeled "almost
interminable. '"125 The parties are first required to negotiate over pro-
posed changes in wages, rules, or working conditions.126 If this nego-
tiation fails to produce agreement, a process of compulsory mediation
begins127 and continues until the NMB, a federal agency, decides that
mediation is no longer fruitful. 128 Finally, if the President deter-
mines that a strike will create an emergency situation, he can appoint
an emergency board129 which further postpones the date either party
may take economic action.130 Ad-hoc congressional intervention fol-
lowing the emergency board stage is common.13 '
During all of these stages of dispute resolution, courts may enjoin
concerted employee action 3 2 and certain types of employer action. 3 3
Control over the time period during which employee and employer
economic action is prohibited is a particularly important difference
between the statutes. Under the RLA, the NMB has virtually unre-
121. H. PERRIrrr, supra note 70, §§ 6.4 -.6 (emphasis in original).
122. Grievance arbitration under the NLRA, while common, is not required unless
the parties have provided for such arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement.
See Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Local 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union, 430 U.S.
243, 250-51 (1977); Smith v. Kerrville Bus Co., Inc., 709 F.2d 914, 917-20 (5th Cir. 1983)
(judicial trial of breach-of-contract claim under collective bargaining agreement not
providing for arbitration).
123. 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1982).
124. Id. § 184.
125. Detroit & T.L.S.R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142, 149 (1969).
126. 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1982).
127. Id. § 157.
128. See IAM v. NMB, 425 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
129. 45 U.S.C. § 160 (1982).
130. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369
(1968).
131. See infra notes 216-87 and accompanying text.
132. See H. PERRITT, supra note 70, §§ 6.4 -.11 (1986 & Supp. 1987).
133. See id. §§ 6.12 -.18.
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viewable discretion to decide how long the mandatory mediation
phase lasts.13 4 In contrast, the NLRA permits economic action as
soon as an impasse occurs in the negotiations. The mediation stage is
optional and does not suspend the right to engage in economic action,
except in disputes between health care employees and employers.135
F. Political Positions
Both management and union interest groups take inconsistent po-
sitions concerning airline and railroad labor law. Management
spokespersons at times oppose government intervention into collec-
tive bargaining;13 6 yet at other times seek government intervention
to limit the right of employees to strike.137 On the other hand, union
representatives exalt free collective bargaining;138 yet regularly seek
legislative and executive intervention to restrict the ambit of collec-
tive bargaining in areas such as imposing labor protectionl3 9 and min-
imum crew size standards.140
When collective bargaining power depends on ever changing eco-
nomic forces as its source, a certain ebb and flow of that power is in-
evitable. In both the railroad and airline industries, economic
conditions and regulatory environments favored union collective bar-
gaining power during the 1960s and 1970s.141 During much of the
1980s, economic and regulatory changes shifted tha balance of power
134. See Maine Central R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, 813
F.2d 484, 493 (1st Cir. 1987) (upholding constitutionality of legislation requiring em-
ployers to reinstate status quo for 60 days); IAM v. NMB, 425 F.2d 527, 537 (D.C. Cir.
1970); Lan Chile Airlines v. NMB, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3655, 3556 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
135. See generally International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697, 701
& n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (summarizing mediation and strike notice requirements for
health care industry).
136. See, e.g., DEMPSEY & THOMS, supra note 30, at 303. "Anticipating that the ICC
would prescribe ... conditions, some railroads entered into voluntary labor-protection
agreements .... Id.
137. See, e.g., Airline Labor Dispute: Hearings on S.J. Res. 186 Before the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 41, 171 (1966) (state-
ment of William J. Curtin, airline spokesperson).
138. See, e.g., id. at 97-98 (statement of P.L. Siemiller, International President of
the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers).
139. DEMPSEY & THOMS, supra note 30, at 301-08 (1986); see L. LECHT, EXPERIENCES
UNDER RAILWAY LABOR LEGISLATION 103 (1955).
140. See generally L. LECHT, supra note 139. Arkansas enacted the first full-crew
law in 1907. See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-720 - to 729 (repealed 1972). In 1911, and again
in 1931, the Arkansas statute was upheld as constitutional. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Nor-
wood, 283 U.S. 249 (1931); Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. Arkansas, 219 U.S. 453 (1911). By
1937, 20 states had full-crew laws. By 1940, four states had train-length laws.
141. See LIPSKY & DONN, supra note 37, at 139-40; Comment, supra note 59, at 1003.
in management's favor.142 Regardless of whether management or
unions currently enjoy favorable economic and regulatory conditions,
the legal arrangements for collective bargaining are not necessarily
inappropriate, nor do they undercut long run labor-management co-
operation such that they need be amended.
G. History of Labor-Management Cooperation
A long history of labor-management cooperation exists in both the
railroad and airline industries, pre-dating-in the case of the railroad
industry-the RLA. Both industries are distinguished by more gov-
ernment intervention than is characteristic of most other private sec-
tor industries in the United States. This tradition of government
intervention, combined with the political power of the railroad and
airline unions, has encouraged much labor-management cooperation
in conjunction with the development of regulatory policies affecting
industry structure, pricing, levels of service, and labor relations. The
RLA was drafted by management and union representatives and en-
acted by Congress virtually without change. 143 A few years later, the
original policies concerning the regulation of airlines were developed
in response to both union pressure for federal regulation of airline la-
bor relations and the evolution of a subsidy program for airline ser-
vice in the 1930s.144
After World War II, major capital investment in railroad technol-
ogy had an enormous impact on the industry. Examples of such in-
vestment include the installation of automatic car retarders,
centralization of train classification work, introduction of the diesel
locomotive, and automation of track work.145 In addition, centralized
traffic control reduced the need for train dispatchers, telegraphers,
and tower operators, as well as permitting higher train speeds, reduc-
ing the need for train crews.146 These changes (except for introduc-
tion of the diesel locomotive) were accomplished without any labor-
management strife which often harms the economy. In the airline
industry, the jet airplane and the wide-bodied jet substantially in-
142. See DEMPSEY & THOMS, supra note 30, at 301; LIPSKY & DONN, supra note 37,
at 174-76; Comment, supra note 59, at 1003-04.
143. Burlington N.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, 481 U.S.
429, 447, n.13 (1987). This occurred at the same time that basic governmental policies
respecting the regulation of railroads were being developed in the context of consider-
able political pressure for nationalization. See Perritt, supra note 57, at 274-82 (ex-
plaining emergence of railroad economic regulation).
144. See Kahn, Collective Bargaining, supra note 106, 428-34, 461-79 (1971) (discuss-
ing relation between economic regulation and collective bargaining in early years of
airline industry).
145. Rehmus, Collective Bargaining, supra note 18, at 85, 89.
146. Id. at 85, 108.
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creased total factor productivity.147 Despite the commuter airline
phenomenon 14s and deregulation,149 all these changes have been ac-
commodated without major harm to the economy from labor unrest.
By these measures, collective bargaining and labor-management co-
operation have good records. However, the record does not look so
good in light of the fact that disruption due to strikes has been
avoided largely by postponing technological change for years or even
decades. Perhaps the strongest example of the failure of this strategy
in the railroad industry is the collapse of Penn Central and the near
collapse of its successor, Conrail. One of numerous causes of the
Penn Central collapse was that labor costs were higher for Penn
Central than for its market competitors.15o Nonetheless, organized
labor steadfastly refused to adjust crew size restrictions 5 1 through
collective bargaining and concentrated its efforts on ensuring that
legislation transferring rail operations from the Penn Central and
other bankrupt carriers to Conrail be accompanied by lifetime labor-
protective arrangements and the perpetuation of fragmented collec-
tive bargaining structures which became serious impediments to la-
bor-management cooperation once Conrail was formed.15 2 For the
most part, these impediments to Conrail's success were removed only
when Conrail itself was about to collapse in 1981.153
The record of adaptation in the railroad industry is largely illu-
sory.154 The apparent success of collective bargaining represented by
the 1964 shopcraft agreement 15 5 is also illusory because management
147. See Kahn, Collective Bargaining, supra note 106, at 444-51.
148. See Dempsey, Collision Course, supra note 30, at 361.
149. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 90-504, 92 Stat. 1705.
150. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 1554, 1558 (Re-
gional Rail Reorg. Ct. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1101 (1984).
151. Labeled as "crew consist" in railroad industry terminology.
152. Railway Labor Executives'Ass'n, 575 F. Supp. at 1558-59.
153. See Perritt, supra note 57.
154. For example, Congress was forced to intervene and impose a settlement of die-
sel firemen and crew consist issues in 1963. See Pub. L. No. 88-108, 77 Stat. 132 (1963)
(terminated 180 days after August 28, 1963); S. Rep. No. 459, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1963), reprinted in 1963 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 833. This intervention was
a last ditch effort to solve the disputes and followed four years of debate before a spe-
cial Presidential commission and an emergency board. See Exec. Order No. 10,891, 25
Fed. Reg. 10,525 (1960). After the congressional action, railroad labor groups suc-
ceeded in re-establishing the 1959 status quo and the crew consist issue has not yet
been resolved to this day. See Perritt, supra note 57, at 288-90; see also Report and
Recommendations of the BLE Study Commission Established by the Signatory Parties
to the September 28, 1982 Agreement Implementing Public Law 97-262, 168-69 (Dec. 8,
1983) [hereinafter BLE Study Commission].
155. See Rehmus, Collective Bargaining, supra note 18, at 160-64 (describing settle-
received little in exchange for revolutionary labor protections. The
only real adaptation to changing railroad market conditions and tech-
nologies has been achieved in the face of profound threats to an en-
terprise's own viability, and even then, only after government
intervention. Railroad industry attitudes have become more flexible
only in light of the collapse of the Rock Island and Milwaukee Rail-
roads. 156 These occurrences have undermined the myth that the gov-
ernment would never allow a railroad to cease operation, no matter
how inefficient.
Collective bargaining in the airline industry has a better record of
adapting to industry structural changes. Tough problems have been
handled with less government intervention, most likely because the
possibility of an air carrier ceasing operation is more readily apparent
and expanding markets during most of the industry's history have
cushioned the effect of employee dislocation.15 7 In addition, there
are fewer restrictions on unilateral carrier action in the airline indus-
try because there is less of a tendency automatically to appoint emer-
gency boards or to enact ad hoc legislation. Government intervention
in emergency disputes and collateral economic regulatory and labor
protection legislation have affected many cooperative efforts as much
as the RLA itself.
III. BASIC POLICY OPTIONS
Deciding what particular provisions of the RLA or other statutes
promote or hinder labor-management cooperation is a difficult task
because there is no consensus on the appropriate role of law in pro-
moting sound labor-management relations.
It is too often forgotten that real-world collective bargaining is not
primarily a creature of law.'5 8 The law may shape collective bargain-
ing by encouraging some institutional arrangements and discouraging
others, or encouraging some types of substantive employment terms
and discouraging others. It may also grant legal rights to engage in
certain conduct and establish obligations not to engage in other types
of conduct. However, the initiative comes from the parties them-
selves in that management and trade unions may either cooperate
ment providing -labor protection to shopcraft employees suffering compensation loss
due to technological improvements, reorganization, or transfer of work).
156. See 45 U.S.C. § 908 (1982) (mandating Milwaukee Railroad and its labor organi-
zations enter into a labor protective agreement); 45 U.S.C. § 1005 (1982) (mandating la-
bor protection agreement between Secretary of Transportation and Rock Island
Railroad).
157. Dempsey, Collision Course, supra note 30, at 343-44.
158. "Collective bargaining was not invented, nor its fundamental features shaped
by legislation, administrative tribunals or the courts in this country .... Address by
John T. Dunlop, Southern Methodist University School of Law conference entitled
The Labor Board at Mid-Century, held in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 2, 1985).
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and engage in mutual creativity or focus their energies on ways to in-
jure and deprive the other of power. Law, therefore, plays only a
limited role in promoting labor-management cooperation. Histori-
cally, railroad and airline labor law's purpose has been constraining
economic disruption by promoting collective bargaining; labor-man-
agement cooperation has not been an explicit statutory goal.
In evaluating the law's limited role, it is helpful to identify basic
policy alternatives for labor law to pursue. One possibility is that the
law should preserve the right to exert economic pressure in the be-
lief that private resolution of labor-management disputes is best as-
sured by the free interplay of economic forces. Another possibility is
that labor law should encourage the private establishment of institu-
tional arrangements to channel economic pressure in constructive di-
rections or otherwise promote desirable labor-management relations.
An example of this is the controversial preference for broader repre-
sentation units in. the health care industry-an initiative which has
engendered more conflict than stability in collective bargaining.159
Yet another option is to create governmental institutions for
resolving certain kinds of disputes, thereby permitting labor and
management to use these forums to resolve disputes without eco-
nomic conflict. Examples of such arrangements are the unfair labor
practice adjudication machinery under the NLRA Act, representa-
tion certification under both the RLA and NLRA, grievance arbitra-
tion machinery under the RLA, and a variety of economic regulatory
forums.1 6
0
When labor-management disputes ultimately threaten the national
health or safety, Congress may be called upon to enact special legisla-
tion to curtail the dispute directly, remedy the underlying causes of
the dispute, or both. Both of the major federal labor statutes implic-
itly contemplate this ultimate possibility through the emergency dis-
pute procedures of the Taft Hartley Act, 16 1 and the emergency board
159. Compare International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (rejecting NLRB's conclusion that health care amendments to NLRA obligate it
to certify only two units in health care institutions) with St. Vincent's Hosp. v. NLRB,
567 F.2d 588, 590 (3d Cir. 1977) (overturning NLRB unit determination because it
failed to comport with congressional committee report language urging "due considera-
tion ... to preventing proliferation of bargaining units in the health care industry");
see also 52 Fed. Reg. 25,142 (1987) (proposed NLRB rule to define collective bargaining
units in the health care industry).
160. See Grebey, Deregulation: Home Run or Strike Out for Labor Relations, 9 IN-
DUS. REL. L.J. 57, 60-61 (1987) (economic regulatory agencies acted in unions' tradi-
tional role of regulating labor markets).
161. 29 U.S.C. §§ 176-180 (1982).
procedures of the RLA.162
A final policy option favors the law restricting the economic weap-
ons available to the more powerful side in a labor-management dis-
pute, thereby equalizing the economic power of both sides. Possible
examples of this are the restriction on secondary pressure contained
in the NLRA163 which disadvantages unions, and the RLA restric-
tions on employers changing the status quo which disadvantages
them.
The most popular statutory scheme to promote labor-management
cooperation-or at least labor-management agreement-is the estab-
lishment of interest dispute mediation machinery' 64 to be used by the
parties either on an optional basis as under the NLRA,165 or on a
mandatory basis as under the RLA.166 This kind of statutory ar-
rangement provides the parties with expert mediators encouraging
them to resolve their disputes peacefully and creatively. The RLA's
success record is mixed at best.167 Conventional wisdom supports the
conclusion that mandatory mediation has been a failure, 168 although
some data suggests it has been more successful than most realize.169
In any event, Presidential inattention to the quality of NMB appoint-
ments has probably reduced the utility of mandatory mediation
under the RLA.
Probably the best role for labor law is to minimize government in-
tervention in labor disputes except in the area of certifying majority
representatives. Government intervention often represents a way for
one side in a labor dispute to improve its position instead of engaging
the other side in resolving the dispute. Labor-management coopera-
tion inherently calls for direct engagement by labor and management
162. 45 U.S.C. § 160 (1982).
163. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1982).
164. Interest disputes are disputes over the negotiation of a new collective bargain-
ing agreement. Interest disputes are. distinguished from grievance disputes, which in-
volve the interpretation or application of an existing collective bargaining agreement.
See INTERNATIONAL LABOR OFFICE, CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION PROCEDURES IN
LABOR DISPUTES 5 (1980). Interest disputes under the RLA are referred to as "major
disputes." See Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 722-23 (1945) (defining the
distinction between "minor disputes" and "major disputes").
165. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982) (requiring notification of the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service, but not prohibiting strikes or changes in the status quo until
mediation is completed).
166. See 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1982) (prohibiting changes in the status quo and, by judi-
cial interpretation, strikes until the NMB has completed mediation).
167. One reason for the mixed record is disagreement over the appropriate criteria
for judging the process. If one believes that an objective of government mediation is to
discourage its use, a decline in mediation cases might be an indicator of success.
168. See Kaufman, Emergency Boards Under the RLA, 9 LAB. L.J. 910 (1958) (false,
popular notion that emergency board procedures have been successful).
169. See W. Curtin, Airline Labor Mediation Since Deregulation: A Continuing
Role (unpublished report presented to the Air Transport Labor Relations Conference
(June 18, 1987)).
[Vol. 16: 501, 1989] Labor-Management Cooperation
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
to resolve disputes and reach agreement on issues of mutual interest.
When the government becomes involved, albeit at the invitation of
one of the parties, this sort of direct engagement is discouraged. The
exception for representation certification is necessary because elec-
tion units must be defined if exclusive representatives are to be se-
lected.17o Furthermore, both sides may need some degree of legal
protection from competing demands for recognition. 171
The RLA arguably restricts opportunities for government inter-
vention in interest disputes because it does not provide the adminis-
trative machinery necessary for resolving unfair labor practices. In
practice, however, the Act encourages government intervention
through the often overused emergency board procedures. While.
some fact-finding and other preparation for ultimate congressional
intervention may be an appropriate part of permanent statutory law,
it is important that Presidential administrations exercise restraint in
using this machinery172 and not use it routinely as did administra-
tions of twenty to thirty years ago.173
IV. CRITICISMS OF THE RLA AND ITS COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING TRADITIONS
This article now considers specific areas of criticism levied upon
the RLA as expressed by both labor and management representatives
familiar with the Act.174
A. Union Concession Agreements
Concessionary bargaining asks employees to give up something in
order to enhance the competitive position and financial welfare of
the enterprise for which they work. Employee representatives
170. The position expressed in the text begs the question of whether exclusive rep-
resentation is desirable, but no contemporary American interest group credibly argues
against exclusive representation.
171. See Lullo v. Fire Fighters Int'l Ass'n Local 1066, 55 N.J. 409, 262 A.2d 681
(1970) (rejecting constitutional challenge to exclusive representation of public employ-
ees and discussing the advantages of exclusive representation according to the will of
the majority of employees in a defined unit).
172. See T. KOCHAN, supra note 8, at 292-93 (empirical evidence suggesting that fact
finding process is effective only when used relatively infrequently).
173. See H. PERRITT, supra note 70, § 13.9.
174. Many of these criticisms were explored in a symposium held at the Villanova
Law School Center for Continuing Legal Education. The symposium was held May 17-
18, 1982, and was entitled Transportation Labor Issues for the 1980s. Other criticisms
have become more prominent in recent years due to recent mergers and labor unrest
in the airline and railroad industries.
presented with a management proposal for employee concessions nat-
urally seek something in return. In recent years, many employee
groups have sought to obtain commitments from management to re-
store the conceded wage levels, benefits, or working conditions; as-
surances related to capital investment; employee participation in
enterprise ownership;175 shares of enterprise income;176 or employee
representatives on corporate boards of directors-the ultimate au-
thority for managing the enterprise.177 Many such concessions are
explored with persons not yet owning or managing the enterprise.
Sometimes employee groups discuss, and wish to make deals with,
persons contemplating obtaining control of an enterprise, but are
willing to do so only if the terms of the labor agreement are
changed. 78
The practical desire to make such arrangements presents a number
of novel labor law issues such as the enforceability of specific types of
bargains under the RLA and bargains struck between employee rep-
resentatives and those other than the present employer. Questions
also exist regarding whether employer compensation of an employee
representative serving on a board of directors or in some other man-
agement capacity offends section 2 of the RLA,179 prohibiting em-
ployers from paying employee representatives. 8 0
Employer promises to issue stock to employees, give income-con-
175. Usually through stock ownership. See Moberly, supra note 9, at 767-69 (dis-
cussing employee ownership, quality circles, and employees on boards of directors).
See generally SIEGEL & WEINBERG, supra note 4.
176. Income can be shared through stock ownership or through bonuses contingent
on an enterprise's income.
177. See, e.g., IAM Stock Ownership Inv. Trust Fund v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 639
F. Supp. 1027 (D. Del. 1986) (dispute over carrier payment of certain expenses related
to administration of trust holding employee stock in carrier).
178. Examples include negotiations for the purchase of strike-bound Eastern Air
Lines, Carl Icahn's acquisition of control of Trans World Airlines, Delta Air Line's ac-
quisition of Western Air Lines, negotiations over the sale of Northwest Airlines, and
the prospect, ultimately unrealized, of Conrail's sale to Norfolk Southern or other in-
vestors in 1985 and 1986. See Bernstein, Move Over Boone, Carl, and Irv--Here Comes
Labor, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 14, 1987, at 124 (describing Pan American World Airways
union negotiations with two different investors seeking control of airline); Dispute
Slows Deal at Eastern, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1989, at D1; The Fight for Northwest Heats
Up, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1989, at D1 (reporting suit by existing management claiming
interference with RLA representations); 3 Eastern Unions Are Said to Back Conces-
sion Pact, N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1989, at D1; Pact With Pan Am Reported by Pilots, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 2, 1987, at D1, col. 4 (concessions in exchange for stock ownership);
Pritzkers in Talks On Pan Am Unit, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1987, at D3, col. 1 (describing
discussions between potential purchaser and unions); Labor Pact Could Foil United
Bids, N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1987, at D1, col. 6 (describing collective bargaining agree-
ment giving unions right to match purchase offers for airline).
179. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1982).
180. See generally Anchorage Community Hosp., 225 N.L.R.B. 575 (1976) (finding
no violation of Section 8(a)(2) of NLRA for hospital union to control seven of fifteen
seats on board of directors or to have loaned hospital money).
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tingent bonuses, make capital investment decisions in particular
ways, and place employee representatives on boards of directors raise
additional questions about the scope of "mandatory" subjects of bar-
gaining under the RLA.181 If both parties agree to a nonmandatory
bargaining subject, their deal may be enforceable, but neither party
can use economic pressure to force an agreement on such a subject.
By implication, lack of agreement on a nonmandatory subject cannot
result in a refusal to agree on a mandatory subject either. Under this
interpretation, a union is not entitled to insist, to the point of strik-
ing, on a capital investment commitment (assuming such a subject is
classified as nonmandatory) in exchange for wage concessions desired
by the employer.
Even enforceability may be a problem. The RLA contains no
equivalent of section 301 of the NLRA182 which makes collective bar-
gaining agreements enforceable. Enforcement of RLA collective bar-
gaining agreements depends on judicial enforcement of the status
quo 8 3 and rights dispute arbitration provisions of the RLA.184 Non-
mandatory subjects of bargaining may be outside the coverage of one
or both of these statutory provisions and agreements addressing such
subjects may be unenforceable.1s 5
To the extent that subjects of interest to employees involved in
concessionary bargaining are, in some sense, off limits under the
RLA, concessionary bargaining cannot proceed equitably without
some sort of subterfuge. It is not at all apparent why the law should
discriminate among subject matter; it may well be that the judicially
created distinction between mandatory and permissive subjects of
bargaining under the RLA should be abandoned.18 6
Further questions arise when parallel representation institutions
181. See H. PERRirr, supra note 70, §§ 6.8, 6.17 (1986 & Supp. 1987) (explaining ac-
ceptance by federal courts of the distinction between mandatory and permissive sub-
jects of bargaining under the RLA); see also Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v.
Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R., 845 F.2d 420 (3d Cir. 1988).
182. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
183. 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1982).
184. Id. §§ 153, 183.
185. It is conceivable that some labor-management agreements could be enforced in
state court as common law contracts. See Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers
Local 776, 346 U.S. 485 (1935). See generally H. PERRITT, supra note 70, § 4.4 (state
courts are courts of general jurisdiction and therefore are competent to hear common
law actions for breach of contract). However, preemption by federal law is very likely.
186. See ALPA v. United Air Lines, Inc., 802 F.2d 886, 902-03 (7th Cir. 1986) (adopt-
ing mandatory-permissive distinction to construe union's good faith obligation in con-
nection with alleged refusal to settle strike until another union's rights were
protected).
are established to implement employee ownership, income, or man-
agement participation schemes and the representative for these pur-
poses is someone other than the collective bargaining representative.
These queries relate to whether employer involvement with the new
type of employee representative on subjects touching on employment
relationships offends the RLA prohibition against company unions,
or the more general prohibition against employer bargaining with
anyone other than the collective bargaining representative under the
RLA.187 Unions holding certification as the majority representative
can delegate their representational authority to virtually anyone. 8 8
The problem manifests itself when a union or individual employees
seek to enforce or block an employer's obligation to deal with an em-
ployee representative other than the union for certain purposes.
It is also possible to insulate employer discussions with employee
representatives over enterprise management subjects from discus-
sions over wages, rules, and working conditions. Such isolation is ar-
tificial, however, particularly when the genesis of the employee
participation in ownership, income, or management was an exchange
for changes in wages, rules, or working conditions. The law should
permit integration between the institution's need to effect employee
participation in ownership, income, and management with the insti-
tution's need to effect collective bargaining.18 9
It may be necessary to amend paragraph four of section 2190 to per-
mit carefully circumscribed management-participation arrangements
embodied in a collective bargaining agreement.191 There is, however,
a policy argument that the purposes of section 2 are satisfied if a col-
lectively bargained-for arrangement involving a literal violation is
ratified by the employees covered by the agreement.192
187. Cf. Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 636
F. Supp. 57 (D. Utah 1986) (granting preliminary injunction against carrier dealing di-
rectly with individual employees in connection with lump-sum separation payments).
There is a factual difference, of course, between a carrier dealing directly with individ-
ual employees instead of through the representative and one dealing with a represen-
tative other than the certified one. Both situations, however, raise legal problems
because they evade the employer's responsibility to deal only with the exclusive repre-
sentative. The analogous problem under the NLRA is considered in 1986 LABOR LAW
REPORT, supra note 1, at 20-25.
188. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1969); Standard Oil
Co. v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 40 (6th Cir. 1963); NLRB v. Roscoe Skipper, Inc., 213 F.2d 793
(5th Cir. 1954).
189. The desirable integration itself can be achieved through private agreement.
190. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1982).
191. Cf. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1982) (providing that employer's establishment of credit
union is not an unfair labor practice).
192. For example, such an arrangement could be the payment of regular board
member compensation to a union officer who sits on an employer board of directors.
See generally 1987 LABOR LAW REPORT, supra note 6, at 42-65, 69 (analyzing the kinds
of entities covered by NLRA and the legal treatment of directors fees paid to union
representatives).
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B. Carrier Reorganization Employee Protection Agreements Under
the RLA
The RLA inhibits labor-management cooperation by making it dif-
ficult for employees to enforce privately negotiated employee protec-
tion agreements. In addition, the Act makes it difficult for employee
representatives to negotiate with a person acquiring a carrier. Such
negotiations are important because of the frequency with which
mergers and reorganizations are the vehicles for improving the effi-
ciency of rail and air carriers, thereby ultimately enhancing employ-
ment opportunities.
The difficulty arises because the potential purchaser of a transpor-
tation enterprise frequently has not been previously associated with
the industry. Furthermore, under the RLA, the employees of an ac-
quired enterprise certainly are not the employees of the potential
purchaser before it actually takes control.193 Accordingly, a union
representing the employees of the enterprise to be acquired must op-
erate outside the RLA in exploring terms of the purchase arrange-
ment with the potential purchaser. This has two significant
implications. First, the potential purchaser risks violating section 2
of the RLA if it agrees to recognize the union as the representative of
its workforce once the acquisition is consummated.194 Second, any
agreement made between the union and the potential purchaser
before the acquisition is consummated may not be enforceable as a
collective bargaining agreement under sections 3 or 6 of the RLA
which are the only provisions that permit legal action to enforce a
collective bargaining agreement.195 In terms of simple statutory con-
struction, it is unclear as to whether such preacquisition agreements
enjoy any legitimacy under sections 3 or 6 of the Act.196
The potential section 2, fourth, violation arises because that section
of the RLA, like section 8 of the NLRA,197 prohibits employers from
interfering with employee choice of bargaining representatives.
193. 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1982) (section titled "First" defining carrier and section titled
"Fifth" defining employee). See generally H. PERRITT, supra note 70, § 6.27 (bargain-
ing before transfer is a difficult question because potential transferee may not be a car-
rier and the labor organization may lack the status of an RLA representative before
such transfer).
194. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1984) (see sub section titled "Fourth"); see Northwest Air Bid-
der Blocked, N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 1989, at D4 (TRO against discussions between unions
and purchaser).
195. Id. §§ 153, 156.
196. See IAM v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 843 F.2d 1119, 1122 n.3 (8th Cir. 1988).
197. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1982).
Before the acquisition goes forward, the potential purchaser has no
work force. Therefore, it cannot be ascertained what representative
those undefined employees prefer. If the potential purchaser agrees
ahead of time to recognize a union to represent the work force before
it is selected, the potential purchaser in effect is imposing its choice
of employee representative on the new work force. This is essen-
tially the same problem presented by any pre-hire agreement, a sub-
ject much litigated under the NLRA.198
The difficulty with enforcing pre-hire labor protection agreements
is not unique to the RLA. The same uncertainty regarding represen-
tation status that may impair enforceability of labor protection agree-
ments under the RLA may also impair enforceability of agreements
under section 301 of the NLRA.' The critics of the RLA must iden-
tify more specifically the unique characteristics making it more vul-
nerable to criticism on this point than the NLRA or explain why pre-
hire labor protective arrangements are especially necessary for indus-
tries covered by the RLA.
There are some practical ways around the problem, however. The
most straightforward way of avoiding the problem is for the potential
purchaser of the enterprise to agree in advance to hire all of the em-
ployees of the acquired carrier and to apply any collectively bar-
gained terms and conditions of employment pertaining to the
acquired carrier. This makes the purchaser both a "recognition" and
"contract compliance" successor,20 0 which means it would be obli-
gated by law to recognize and bargain with the union representing
the acquired carriers' employees. Purchasers may make such agree-
ments because they want to avoid labor trouble or because of busi-
ness decisions to maintain workforce continuity. This strategy,
however, cannot work when the potential purchaser is already a car-
rier with its own work force. In these circumstances, the employees
of the purchaser may well have their own collective bargaining
198. Pre-hire agreements are collective bargaining agreements negotiated before an
employer has a workforce. When the NLRB first asserted jurisdiction over the con-
struction industry, it held pre-hire agreements, common in that industry, unlawful
along with other referral, hiring, and employment practices. Recognizing that the con-
struction industry is significantly different from other industries, Congress enacted
section 8(f) specifically to authorize pre-hire agreements. See id. § 158(f). For many
years, the NLRB nevertheless found that such agreements were not enforceable under
section 8(a)(5), and the courts limited their enforceability under section 301 of the La-
bor-Management Relations Act. See John Deklewa & Sons, 282 N.L.R.B. 184 (1987)
(overruling prior cases and holding that construction industry pre-hire agreements are
enforceable under section 8(a)(5)); see also John S. Griffith Constr. Co. v. United Bd.
of Carpenters, 785 F.2d 706, 712 (9th Cir. 1986) (addressing the validity of an em-
ployer's repudiation of pre-hire agreement in which both section 301 and section 8(f)
were analyzed).
199. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
200. See H. PERRIrr, supra note 70, §§ 5.17 -.19.
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agreements and representation arrangements. If the purchaser
makes agreements with the employees of the acquired carrier incon-
sistent with its obligations to its own present employees, it risks con-
flicting obligations under the RLA.201
Moreover, the problem of contract enforceability may persist. A
pre-hire agreement might be enforceable as a common law contract
even if it is not enforceable under sections 3 and 6 of the RLA. How-
ever, the common law contract enforcement issue raises all of the dif-
ficulties which confronted courts presented with claims of breach of
collective bargaining agreements before enactment of the major labor
laws. These difficulties include standing to sue as well as the nature
of the collective bargaining agreement as a contract.202 These diffi-
culties are substantial impediments to the use of collective bargaining
to address labor protection issues instead of relying upon regulatory
prescription of labor conditions. Also, they make it difficult for crea-
tive employment concessions to be exchanged for capital or income
participation in a restructured enterprise.
Simply amending the Act or interpreting it judicially to enforce
pre-hire agreements presents difficulties. The most obvious difficulty
is the potential interference with free employee choice. Another dif-
ficulty is that making it easy for a predecessor union to impose its
collective arrangements on a purchaser could reduce the flexibility
needed to restructure a failing enterprise. 20 3 Anyone who has partic-
ipated in restructuring or concessionary bargaining knows that an es-
sential ingredient of such bargaining is the possibility that, absent
agreement, the enterprise will be restructured in a way that the em-
ployees do not like. If existing arrangements can be perpetuated
under the Act, the incentive for labor-management cooperation is
eliminated. A clear example of this is the long period during which
the Interstate Commerce Act was interpreted to perpetuate existing
201. See IBTCWHA Local 2707 v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 813 F.2d 1359, 1364 (9th
Cir. 1987) see also (granting an injunction against merger until both successor and
predecessor corporations agreed to accept arbitration of obligations to protect employ-
ees affected by merger), vacated & remanded, 108 S. Ct. 53 (1987); see also 45 U.S.C.
§ 152 (1982) (subsections titled "Second" and "Ninth" which address representation of
the parties designated without interference, influence, or coercion by either party, and
if placing questions of representation under the exclusive jurisdiction of the NMB); 29
C.F.R. § 1202.3 (1988) (setting forth the NMB duties concerning the mediation of rep-
resentation disputes).
202. See H. PERRITT, supra note 70, § 1.12.
203. See In re Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 658 F.2d 1149, 1173-75 (7th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied sub nom. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982).
employee arrangements regardless of enterprise restructuring,20 4 re-
sulting in unacceptably high labor costs in the railroad industry.
While there is no direct evidence that these theoretical difficulties
have inhibited creative labor-management cooperation in the indus-
tries covered by the RLA,205 it is always hard to measure the effect
of legal uncertainties which may discourage entering into certain
types of transactions. The RLA should be amended to permit labor
protection arrangements negotiated in contemplation of a merger or
acquisition to be enforced. When such enforcement conflicts with
representation arrangements of the surviving carrier, money dam-
ages should be available if appropriate.
A legitimate policy distinction exists between enforcing labor pro-
tection arrangements against the transferor carrier and enforcing
them against a nonconsenting transferee carrier. If such agreements
were to be enforceable against a nonconsenting transferee, they
would have the greatest potential of interfering with representation
arrangements and would present the greatest burdens to enterprise
restructuring. The best solution is to ensure that such agreements
are enforceable against transferor carriers, both by injunctive relief
and damages.
C. Fragmentation of Representation
Representation under the RLA is fragmented to a greater degree
than it is under the NLRA.206 This fragmentation results from a
narrow definition of the permissible election units for selection of
collective bargaining representatives. 207 The NMB has historically
taken the position that the RLA's definition of craft or class, which
in turn determines permissible election units, is fixed by statute and
reinforced by actual historic practices in the railroad and airline in-
dustries. Therefore, the Board lacks discretion to redefine election
units in order to serve broader policy goals.208
There are two problems with narrowly defined election units.
First, a proliferation of election units makes it likely that bargaining
204. See New York Dock Ry. v. United States, 609 F.2d 83, 86-90 (2d Cir. 1979).
205. But see Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R., 845 F.2d
420 (3d Cir. 1987) (declining to exempt carrier from its duty under the RLA to bargain
in good faith with its union despite the fact a sale of all its assets was pending, and
even though ICC declined to impose labor protection), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2013
(1988).
206. Some of the fragmentation also results from traditional bargaining structures
in the airline and railroad industries, in which craft unions negotiate separately. The
point made in the text is that election unit definition influences bargaining unit
practices.
207. See Chicago, A. & E. Ry., 1 N.M.B. 229, 238-40 (1942) (case nos. R-864, R-865).
208. Such conformity between election unit and bargaining unit boundaries is not
legally required but is likely to occur. See T. KOCHAN, supra note 8, at 93 (explaining
how negotiation units may or may not be the same as election units).
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will be fragmented along election unit boundaries.209 This considera-
bly increases the number of collective bargaining negotiations and
the number of separate collective bargaining agreements. Each sepa-
rate negotiation presents the potential for a work stoppage or for uni-
lateral employer action. Each separate collective bargaining
agreement presents the potential for dissimilarities of wages, rules,
or working conditions which has a destabilizing effect. Second, the
trend toward labor-management cooperation implies in many cases a
job redefinition. When bargaining units are narrow, the likelihood is
greater that job redefinition will raise serious work jurisdiction is-
sues, requiring the involvement of more than one collective bargain-
ing representative and modifications in more than one collective
bargaining agreement. This complicates the ability of the collective
bargaining process to accommodate labor-management cooperation in
the form of job enlargement.
In making the argument for broader election units, it is important
to acknowledge the argument for smaller geographic units. The
NMB, while perpetuating craft or class fragmentation, has histori-
cally insisted that representatives be certified only on a carrier wide
basis, as opposed to a facility-by-facility basis.21o Obviously, this
raises the costs and logistical difficulties of organizing labor groups.
The Teamsters Union has pressed vigorously for narrower geo-
graphic units without success. Management's position on this issue is
that the integrated nature of railroad and airline operations means
that a strike against one facility would shut down the entire carrier.
Therefore, the system-wide unit policy is appropriate to minimize dis-
ruptions in commerce.
While the historic position of the NMB suggests an amendment of
the RLA is necessary to enlarge craft or class definition, the Board
actually has substantial discretion to act on its own under the ex-
isting statute. In fact, in a few instances, the Board has changed his-
torically established craft or class boundaries using various
209. See infra note 210. In another respect, representation under the RLA is less
fragmented than under the NLRA. Employees covered by the NLRA can be repre-
sented by different representatives at different plants or facilities. Under the RLA,
the NMB generally requires that representation be system wide. Compare Air Florida,
Inc., 7 N.M.B. 162, 164-65 (1979) (case no. R-4766) (contrasting NMB and NLRB policy
on geographic fragmentation of units) with National R.R. Passenger Corp., 13 N.M.B.
128, 133-34 (1986) (case no. R-5605) (finding Amtrak's Washington Terminal operation
to contain separate crafts or classes).
210. See, e.g., Guyana Airways, 11 N.M.B. 11 (1983) (case nos. R-5406 to -5408); Air
France Cargo Agents, 5 N.M.B. 223 (1976) (case no. R-4492).
rationalizations. 211
If collective bargaining representatives are to be effective, they
must maintain their institutional strength. The narrower the institu-
tion's constituency, however, the more vigilant the representatives
need to be to resist any change in collectively bargained arrange-
ments which would reduce its membership over time. Lower mem-
bership results in less dues income which in turn causes a weakening
in the strength of the collective bargaining representative. Accord-
ingly, it is not unexpected or unreasonable for a trade union repre-
senting a narrowly defined group of employees to resist significant
changes in the jurisdiction of that unit. Conversely, if a trade union
represents a broader unit of employees, the union has more flexibil-
ity to consider realigning job definitions without jeopardizing its in-
stitutional strength.
Although substantial union consolidation has reduced the fragmen-
tation problem, at least partially,21 2 the NMB should broaden craft or
class definitions as a matter of policy to further combat fragmenta-
tion. Failing that, the RLA should be amended to require the NMB
to minimize fragmentation in defining election units for representa-
tion purposes.
D. Impact of Union Institutional Adjustment
Restrictions on carrier payments to unions foreclose potentially de-
sirable agreements that cushion the institutional impact of change.
Section 2 of the RLA prohibits carriers from supporting collective
bargaining representatives.21 3 Motivated by the desire to eliminate
the corrupting influence of "company unions,"214 this broad prohibi-
211. Compare Switchmen's Union of N. Am. v. NMB, 320 U.S. 297, 309 (1940)
(Reed, J., dissenting) (quoting the Board's holding that the RLA does not vest it with
discretion to split a single carrier for the purpose determining of who is eligible to vote
for a representative) and KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 3 N.M.B. 1, 4-5 (1953) (case no.
C-2098) (expressing danger of dividing traditional crafts or classes) and Pend' Oreille
Valley R.R., 10 N.M.B. 402, 407 (1983) (case nos. R-5392 to -5397) (historical craft or
class boundaries must be honored even if it means one-person units) with National
R.R. Passenger Corp., 13 N.M.B. 128, 133-34 (1986) (case no R-5605) (finding Amtrak's
Washington Terminal operation to contain separate craft or class).
212. In 1966, the previously separate Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and En-
ginemen (BLF&E), Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen (BRT), Switchmen's Union of
North America (SUNA), and Order of Railway Conductors (ORC), merged to become
the United Transportation Union (UTU). In the 1970s and 1980s, some merger move-
ments occurred among the railroad nonoperating crafts, with the American Railway
and Airline Supervisor's Association (ARSA) and the Brotherhood of Railway Carmen
(BRC) merging into the the Transportation Communications International Union (for-
merly Brotherhood of Railway and Airline Clerks or BRAC), and the Railroad Yard
Masters of America (RYA) merging into the UTU.
213. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1982) (see subsection titled "Fourth" placing various restric-
tions on employers with respect to labor unions and collective bargaining).
214. L. LECHT, supra note 139, at 78 (providing backround to the 1934
amendments).
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tion can discourage voluntary arrangements permitting a carrier to
reduce unneeded positions while cushioning an employee representa-
tive against potentially destructive effects of lost dues as membership
is reduced. These provisions of section 2 should be amended to per-
mit certain kinds of carrier support payments when they are part of a
bona fide collective bargaining agreement.
E. Excessive or Prolonged Government Intervention
In the RLA and the NLRA, Congress created permanent statutory
mechanisms to reduce economic conflict and to control the use of
economic weapons between labor and management in labor-manage-
ment conflict situations. The emergency dispute provisions of the
Taft-Hartley Act and the RLA envision executive and legislative in-
tervention as a last resort.21 5 Congress has employed ad hoc legisla-
tion frequently in railroad industry disputes, and to a lesser degree in
the airline industry, because of the perceived importance of these in-
dustries to the national economy.
American labor policy relies on market forces supplemented by
collective bargaining to determine wage levels. Such reliance implies
tolerance of a certain amount of economic conflict as the necessary
price of collective bargaining. A threshold exists, however, above
which the conflict threatens national security, the long-term health
of the economy, and the health and safety of the public. Above this
threshold, strikes are considered to be "emergency strikes." Both the
RLA and the NLRA contain procedures for handling emergency
strikes.216 This threshold is not determined objectively, rather, it is
defined through an interplay of political sentiment at a particular
time in the context of a particular dispute.217 Today, government in-
tervention in interest disputes through fact-finding and arbitration is
much more common in the public sector than in the private sector.
Indeed, both procedures have become standard features of state pub-
lic employee bargaining statutes.218
Section 10 of the RLA219 provides emergency dispute procedures
215. See 29 U.S.C. § 176 (1982); 45 U.S.C. § 160 (1982).
216. See generally H. PERRIr, supra note 70, §§ 13.4 -.9, (discussing the Taft-Hart-
ley Act and the RLA provisions for emergency dispute procedures).
217. See generally id. §§ 10.1 -.21.
218. See T. KOCHAN, supra note 8, at 292-93 (empirical evidence from public sector
suggests that fact finding process is effective only when it is used relatively infre-
quently); Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611, 1702-
04 (1984) (discussing patterns of state law).
219. 45 U.S.C. § 160 (1982).
for settling disputes in the railroad and airline industries.22 o If the
disputants cannot settle through negotiation,221 mediation, 222 or vol-
untary interest arbitration,223 then section 10 authorizes the NMB to
decide whether the dispute "threaten[s] substantially to interrupt in-
terstate commerce to a degree such as to deprive any section of the
country of essential transportation service."2 2 4 If the NMB decides
that the criterion is met, it notifies the President, who has discretion
to "create a[n] [emergency] board to investigate and report respecting
such dispute." 225 Section 10 requires emergency boards to report
their findings to the President within thirty days after their appoint-
ment, and prohibits the parties to the dispute from changing the sta-
tus quo (except by agreement) during the board's deliberations and
for thirty days thereafter.226
The emergency procedures of the RLA have been used almost rou-
tinely in railroad disputes, 227 and either the President or Congress
have repeatedly taken extraordinary action after the emergency
board procedures of the RLA failed to settle major transportation
disputes.228 From 1935 to 1975, 198 emergency boards were ap-
pointed, 229 leading commentators and policy makers to judge section
10 of the RLA as a "disappointment by the particular measure of
220. Section 201 of the RLA makes interstate air carriers subject to all the provi-
sions of the Act except for the procedures contained in section 3 regarding grievance
disputes. See id. § 181. Sections 204 and 205 require airlines and labor organizations
representing their employees to establish adjustment boards to resolve grievance dis-
putes. See id. §§ 184-185.
221. See id. § 156 (imposing a status quo obligation on labor and management until
negotiations occur over proposed changes).
222. See id. § 155 (authorizing the NMB to mediate disputes upon its own motion or
upon the request of either party, and prohibiting changes in the status quo during
mediation).
223. Section 5 of the NRLA also requires the NMB to "endeavor... to induce the
parties to submit their controversy to arbitration," which is provided for in sections 7,
8, and 9. See id. §§ 155, 157-159.
224. Id. § 160.
225. Id
226. See Locomotive Eng'rs v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 372 U.S. 284 (1963) (per curiam)
(after the parties have exhausted the procedures provided by the Act, they are rele-
gated to self-help in adjusting the dispute, subject only to the invocation of section 10).
Until the procedures are exhausted, the courts have construed the statutory status quo
language to prohibit strikes. See Detroit & T.L.S.R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 396
U.S. 142, 150 (1969) (RLA status quo provisions all preclude strikes as well as employer
change in working conditions); Alton & So. Ry. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & Airline
Clerks, 481 F. Supp. 130, 131 (D.D.C. 1978) (enjoining strike after appointment of
emergency board). It also appears that the appointment of an emergency board after a
strike has continued for some time permits the strike to be enjoined, and the carrier to
be ordered to restore the prestrike status quo. Id. at 131.
227. The record of governmental restraint in airline disputes has been much better
in recent years than in the railroad industry.
228. Cullen, supra note 112, at 154-55.
229. Id.; Kaufman, supra note 168, at 910.
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gross frequency of use."230 By the early 1960s, the section 10 proce-
dures became almost completely ineffective. 231 Because the section
10 procedures were not settling strikes, the President and Congress
became involved in a series of difficult disputes.232 In other words,
the moral suasion supposedly resulting from fact-finding,2 33 was in-
sufficient to resolve disputes short of Presidential or congressional
action.234
In 1971, the Nixon Administration implemented policies reforming
rail industry bargaining structure,235 and decreasing the readiness of
the President to appoint emergency boards, especially in single-car-
rier disputes. 236
Twenty-five emergency boards were appointed during the ten-year
period ending in 1988.237 This is well below the fifty-year average of
four per year. Only one board involved an airline dispute, and its ap-
pointment was mandated by statute.2 38 Five boards involved national
railroad disputes which supposedly posed a threat to the national
economy.239
230. Cullen, supra note 112, at 170 (characterizing the decade of the 1970s as "disas-
trous" for the emergency dispute provisions of the RLA).
231. See H. PERRPTT, supra note 70, § 13.11.
232. Cullen, supra note 112, at 173-74. Also during this period, the railroad indus-
try embarked on a major public relations campaign against "featherbedding." See Per-
ritt, supra note 57, at 288 (describing campaign and giving some examples of campaign
advertisements).
233. H. PERRiTr, supra note 70, § 13.16 (discussing how fact finding is supposed to
work).
234. THE NMB AT 50, supra note 23, at 63.
235. The main improvements in bargaining structure involved encouragement of
common expiration dates and comprehensive moratoria provisions in rail industry
agreements. Cf. Cullen, supra note 112, at 174-76; see also Perritt, supra note 57, at
290-93.
236. This policy of less intervention is credited to then Secretary of Labor George
P. Shultz. See Cullen, supra note 112, at 174.
237. THE NMB AT 50, supra note 23 (available from the NMB, Washington, D.C.).
For a list of emergency boards appointed during this period, see H. PERRITT, supra
note 70, § 13.9 & n.54. In addition to those listed in H. PERRITT, supra note 70, Emer-
gency Board 209 was appointed on May 16, 1986, to investigate the Maine Central-
BMWE dispute. Exec. Order No. 12,557 (1986). Emergency Board 210 was appointed
on May 6, 1986, to investigate a dispute between the Long Island Rail Road and various
other organizations, Exec. Order 12,558 (1986). Emergency Board 211 was appointed
on July 15, 1986, to investigate a national railroad dispute with nonoperating crafts.
Exec. Order 12,562 (1986). Emergency Board 212 was appointed on September 12, 1986,
to investigate a dispute between the Long Island Rail Road and most of its labor orga-
nizations. Exec. Order No. 12,563 (1986).
238. Id at 51 (describing political compromise which led to appointment of emer-
gency board and enactment of the Airline Deregulation Act).
239. Emergency Boards 190, 194, 208, 209, and 211. Emergency Board 209 dealt only
Eighteen boards appointed during this most recent period, how-
ever, suggest that the temptation to use the emergency dispute proce-
dures to deal with relatively minor, or localized strikes, is real still.
Two boards involved disputes on a single freight railroad.240 Sixteen
involved commuter railroad disputes where use of the procedure is
mandatory.2 41 While the number of boards appointed has declined,
the limited geographic and market share impact of the disputes lead-
ing to their appointment suggests caution in concluding that the
President is limiting the emergency board procedure to strikes of
truly emergency proportions.2 42
Ad hoc congressional intervention into railroad and airline disputes
became commonplace during the decade of the 1960s. In 1963, Con-
gress enacted legislation requiring compulsory arbitration to solve a
dispute over elimination of firemen from diesel locomotives.243 In
1966, Congress legislated to help settle an airline industry dispute.
The 1966 intervention occurred after negotiations failed between the
International Association of Machinists (IAM) and five major air-
lines.244 A strike ensued, and while the strike progressed, Senator
Morris introduced legislation which would have permitted the Presi-
dent to make a determination that would lead to federal district
court establishment of a receivership over the properties of the
struck carriers.2 4 5 Earlier, Senator Lausche had introduced legisla-
tion providing for compulsory arbitration.2 46 Neither proposal was
enacted.247 After the Senate passed a bill extending the basic strike
prohibition contained in the RLA for an additional thirty days and
permitting further extensions by the President, the strike was settled
with a dispute on the Maine Central, but was appointed after secondary picketing
spread across the country.
240. Emergency Boards 191 and 200.
241. Emergency Boards 192, 193, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206,
207, 210, 212.
242. See Arouca & Perritt, Transportation Labor Law, supra note 115, at 659-71
(recommending "neoabstentionist" approach to labor policy in transportation).
243. See Brotherhood of Locomotive, Firemen & Enginemen v. Chicago B. &
Q.R.R., 225 F. Supp. 11 (D.D.C. 1964), qf'd, 331 F.2d 1020 (D.C. Cir. 1964). See gener-
ally Akron & Barberton Belt R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 385 F.2d 581
(D.C. Cir. 1967) (dispute over the elimination of diesel firemen and a reduction in the
number of train crew members); Act of Aug. 28, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-108, 77 Stat. 132.
244. On August 9, 1965, Eastern Airlines, National Airlines, Northwest Airlines,
Trans World Airlines, and United Airlines had agreed with the IAM to a procedure for
joint negotiations of pay and work rule issues. When no settlement was forthcoming,
President Johnson appointed Emergency Board 166 under the RLA on April 21, 1966.
On July 8, the IAM called a strike and on July 29, the President met with the parties.
245. S.J. Res. 180, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 112 CONG. REC. 16775-76 (1966).
246. Amendment No. 721 to S.J. Res. 186, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 112 CONG. REC.
18058 (1966).
247. Arguably, because legislation was not enacted, this is not an instance of con-
gressional intervention. Nevertheless, active consideration of legislation undoubtedly
is a strong inducement for the parties to modify their positions.
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without legislation.248
Congress subsequently intervened in several railroad disputes. In
1967, Congress dealt with a shopcraft dispute by extending the no-
strike provisions of the RLA for twenty days, 249 then for an addi-
tional forty-five days,2 50 and finally by providing a special board to
recommend a settlement which would become binding in the absence
of agreement between the parties.251 In 1970, Congress delayed an-
other shopcraft strike,252 and subsequently imposed a wage increase
with respect to certain operating and clerical employees, leaving it to
the parties to resolve other parts of their dispute.253 In the 1971
signalmen dispute, Congress again extended the no-strike provisions
of the RLA and imposed a pay increase.254 In 1973, Congress inter-
vened in the Penn Central crew consist dispute, delaying economic
action while the Secretary of Transportation developed a plan for re-
organization of the northeast railroads.255 Similar intervention con-
tinued into the 1980s.256 In the 1986 Maine Central dispute, Congress
enacted legislation imposing certain terms of employment on a rail
carrier which apparently was winning a bitter strike.257 In 1988,
Congress enacted legislation extending the status quo period in the
crew consist dispute between the UTU and the Chicago and
248. S.J. Res. 186, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 112 CONG. REc. 18,322 (1966).
249. Act of Apr. 12, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-10, 81 Stat. 12.
250. Act of May 2, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-13, 81 Stat. 13.
251. Act of July 17, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-54, 81 Stat. 122.
252. Act of Mar. 4, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-203, 84 Stat. 22 (delaying strike); Act of
Apr. 9, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-226, 84 Stat. 118 (imposing settlement).
253. Act of Dec. 10, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-541, 84 Stat. 1407.
254. Act of May 18, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-17, 85 Stat. 39.
255. Act of Feb. 9, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-5, 87 Stat. 5; S. REP. No. 18, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess., reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 1217, 1222 (restoring the sta-
tus quo and prohibiting strike in connection with Penn Central work rule dispute).
256. See generally S.J. Res. 250, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (imposing the recom-
mendations of Emergency Board 194, relating to pay differentials between locomotive
firemen and trainmen); Milwaukee Railroad Restructuring Act, Pub. L. No. 96-101,
§ 11, 93 Stat. 736, 742 (1979) (codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 901-922 (1982)); Rock Island Rail-
road Transition and Employee Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 96-254, § 107, 94 Stat. 399,
402 (1980); Northeast Rail Service Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 644-687; Air-
line Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 44, 92 Stat. 1753 (codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1308 (1982)).
257. See Maine Cent. R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, 813
F.2d 484, 493 (1st. Cir.) (finding that status quo legislation following the failure of
emergency board procedures is constitutional), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 91 (1987); Maine
Cent. R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, 835 F.2d 368, 372
(1st Cir. 1987) (finding ultimate Congressional resolution of dispute constitutional),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct 2034 (1988).
Northwestern.25 8
Frequently, congressional action in transportation labor disputes
such as that described in the preceding paragraphs has been preceded
by direct Presidential mediation efforts.259 Since the Korean War,
three major instances of ad hoc Presidential intervention in railroad
and airline labor disputes have occurred. These instances involved an
airline flight engineers dispute in the late 1950s and early 1960s, 260 a
railroad work rules dispute during the same period,26 1 and a crew
size dispute on new wide-bodied jet aircraft in 1980.282
Presidential involvement can improve the quality of the dialogue
in disputes, but the historical record does not support any conclusion
that such Presidential intervention avoids strike activity, strike
threats, or lessens the perceived need for subsequent Presidential or
congressional involvement.
Presidential involvement may be warranted in truly exceptional
cases posing a real threat to the nation's security or economy. In
such cases, Presidential intervention can influence the course of the
dispute in much the same way as fact-finding. Hasty intervention,
however, in railroad or airline disputes only diminishes the power of
the President to influence events when real emergencies threaten be-
cause it tends to make such intervention seem routine, less news-
worthy, and less worthy of public attention.263
258. S.J. Res. 374, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
259. See H. PERRirr, supra note 70, § 13.17.
260. See Exec. Order No. 10,921, 26 Fed. Reg. 1553 (1961) (appointing a special com-
mission to investigate the flight engineer dispute, after a national strike).
261. In February of 1959, the railroad industry proposed the creation of a Presiden-
tial commission to investigate and report on the possibility of a major overhaul in rail-
road work rules. Initially, President Eisenhower refused in the face of opposition by
rail labor. After the carriers served section 6 notices proposing changes in work rules,
however, the carriers and labor organizations agreed to the appointment of a Presiden-
tial Railroad Commission, which was created by Executive Order 10,891 in November,
1960. See Exec. Order No. 10,891, 25 Fed. Reg. 10,525 (1960). The Commission's report,
submitted to the President on February 28, 1962, represented the most comprehensive
analysis of railroad industrial relations that had ever been made. Nevertheless, dis-
putes relating to the diesel firemen and crew consist were not settled on terms recom-
mended by the Commission. This led to the enactment of the aforementioned
compulsory arbitration legislation by the Congress.
262. In late 1980, the ALPA, building on its successful political protests against air-
line hijacking in 1972, denominated a "suspension of service," threatened another in
order to force the FAA to require three pilots on new wide-bodied aircraft then being
designed by airframe manufacturers. To forestall the work stoppage, President Rea-
gan appointed a Presidential Task force on Aircraft Crew Complement, which held
hearings in April, 1981. See 46 Fed. Reg. 10,645 (1981) (announcement of public
hearings).
263. Appointment of Presidential emergency boards in local commuter rail disputes
seems particularly ludicrous. This course of action is contemplated by amendments to
the RLA that were made by the Northeast Rail Services Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35,
§ 1157, 95 Stat. 643, 681 (adding section 9A to the RLA, codified at 45 U.S.C. § 159a
(1982)).
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In reaction to the frequent ad hoc congressional intervention of the
1960s, the Nixon Administration proposed legislation intended to re-
duce the role of Congress as the ultimate arbiter in emergency dis-
putes between transportation labor and management.26 4  The
administration's proposal applied the traditional Taft-Hartley proce-
dures to the transportation industries, and added three new options
which the President could exercise in the event that no settlement
was reached during the eighty-day injunction. 26 5 The first option
permitted the President to invoke an additional cooling-off period of
up to thirty days during which collective bargaining continued with
the aid of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service.26 6 The
second option established a procedure whereby a special impartial
board, appointed by the President, would order partial operation
while permitting a partial strike if the partial operation could occur
without imperiling the "national health and safety." 267 The goal of
the partial operation was to permit sufficient economic impact to en-
courage settlement while reducing public disruption. 268 The final op-
tion which the President could choose was a procedure for "final
offer selection." Under this final option, the President would direct
each party to submit final offers to the Secretary of Labor within
three days. The Secretary would then transmit the offers to the
other party and collective bargaining would continue for five days. If
the additional collective bargaining failed to produce an agreement,
the parties could select a three member panel to act as "final-offer
selector."269 The panel would hold hearings within thirty days and
select the most "reasonable" offer as the basis for a new contract.2 70
None of the proposals for emergency dispute legislation were en-
acted. A serious national debate over emergency strike procedures
has not occurred since the early 1970s, largely because there have
been fewer instances of strikes leading to special legislation on labor
disputes since the hearings on those bills.271 While the 1970 propos-
264. See S. 560, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R. 3396, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
265. See S. 560, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 217-219 (1971).
266. IL § 217. The proposal centralized emergency dispute mediation in a single
agency rather than continuing a special mediation agency for railroad and airline
disputes.
267. Id. § 218.
268. This idea is embodied in the Hawaii public employee labor relations act.
269. See S. 560, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 219 (1971).
270. 1&
271. Special procedures enacted as part of the Northeast Rail Services Act of 1981
for commuter rail labor negotiations do not qualify as emergency dispute procedures of
general applicability. They were intended solely to facilitate a one-time transition. See
als illustrate various combinations of emergency dispute procedures,
they included no new types of procedure, except possibly the "statu-
tory strike" idea.2 72
Past and proposed emergency dispute procedures depend primarily
on fact-finding. Fact-finding can influence interest dispute settle-
ment in three basic ways:
(1) It can affect the willingness of employer and employee groups to
cooperate with the struck employer or the strikers, thus changing the
balance of economic power in the dispute and forcing a settlement
through that means.
(2) It can influence the legislature, or rarely, other political institu-
tions, to impose a particular settlement on the disputing employer
and employees.
(3) It can serve to predict the outcome of other, more compulsory,
dispute resolution procedures, thereby encouraging settlement by de-
flating unrealistic party expectations.
The popular notion that a fact-finding report mobilizes public opin-
ion, thereby putting pressure on the parties to settle, almost surely is
misplaced. One author has commented:
Every study of factfinding in the public sector has concluded ... that it has
not had this result [of mobilizing public pressure sufficient to force a settle-
ment]. In most cases the interest and concern of the public is not aroused suf-
ficiently to activate the pressure needed to produce a settlement. Public
interest is apparently aroused only when a strike threatens or actually im-
poses direct hardship.2 7 3
The emergency fact-finding procedures of the RLA and Taft-Hartley
Act are generally regarded as failures in promoting settlement,
though there is some dissent from this conclusion.274 Public em-
ployee fact-finding procedures have been effective however, at least
when they have been used sparingly.275
Mediation is the most commonly used form of government inter-
vention in emergency disputes, primarily because it is authorized for
labor disputes not reaching the level of an emergency.2 76 It is diffi-
Northeast Rail Services Act of 1981, § 1145, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 643, 669 (codified
at 45 U.S.C. § 588 (1982)). The strike between Eastern Air Lines and the IAM, which
began on March 4, 1989, continues as of this writing and may produce legislation. See
Eastern's Route to the Brink, Philadelphia Inquirer, Mar. 13, 1989, at C1.
272. A statutory strike is a strike that occurs within particular limits defined by
statute, aimed at limiting the public impact of a strike, while ensuring that economic
pressure is brought to bear on both sides of the dispute.
273. T. KOCHAN, supra note 8, at 293.
274. See Cullen, supra note 112, at 185.
275. See H. NORTHRUP, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION AND GOVERNMENT INTERVEN-
TION IN LABOR DIsPuTEs 290-91 (1966); Hoh, infra note 278; Stern, infra note 281; see
also infra note 282.
276. See Labor-Management Relations Act, §§ 203-204, 29 U.S.C. §§ 173-174 (1982)
(authorizing the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service to proffer services in any
labor dispute affecting interstate commerce, and requiring parties to dispute to partici-
pate in mediation thus proffered); Railway Labor Act, § 5, 45 U.S.C. § 155 (1982) (au-
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cult to evaluate the effectiveness of emergency dispute mediation be-
cause emergency dispute is ill-defined and so is mediation. One can
draw some tentative conclusions from the mediation record in gen-
eral under the RLA and from state experience with mediation of
public employee disputes.
Several commentators assert that the availability of mediation or
other dispute resolution procedures in every case retards bargaining,
because the parties save concessions for post-negotiation stages in the
dispute resolution process.27 7 Compulsory or "preventive" mediation
is especially subject to this criticism.2 78 The empirical evidence sug-
gests that mediation is particularly effective in settling public sector
labor disputes when unsuccessful mediation is followed by fact-find-
ing or compulsory arbitration.279 Similarly, there is some evidence
that allowing arbitrators to engage in mediation can produce volun-
tary settlements.2 0
Many decades of experience with peacetime emergency dispute
procedures under the Taft-Hartley Act and the RLA reveal that Pro-
fessor Northrup was right when he said in 1946 that government in-
tervention in private labor disputes tends to politicize labor disputes,
to the detriment of the effectiveness of collective bargaining.
Government intervention in public sector labor disputes has more
proponents than government intervention in private sector emer-
gency disputes. Nevertheless, many of the criticisms leveled at the
fact-finding and interest arbitration provisions of the RLA also have
been directed at similar procedures in the public sector.281
thorizing NMB to proffer mediation services); Id. § 6, 45 U.S.C. § 156 (precluding
changes in the status quo until mediation has been completed). In addition, Presidents
have engaged personally in various forms of mediation. See H. PERRITT, supra note 70,
§§ 13.3, 13.17.
277. Hoh, The Effectiveness of Mediation in Public Sector Arbitration Systems:
The Iowa Experience, 39 ARB. J. 30, 31-32 (June 1984) (reporting mediation success
rates as high as 70%, although earlier experience yielded a success rate of only 50%).
278. See H. NORTHRUP, supra note 276, at 159-61.
279. Compare Hoh, supra note 278, at 33-34 (successful mediation) with id. at 37
(mediation less successful in Massachusetts after arbitration added as terminal step af-
ter fact-finding). See Newman, Interest Arbitration-Practice and Procedures, in LA.
BOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 44, 47 (1977) (report that mediation
reduces arbitration requests by 50% in Pennsylvania).
280. See Stern, The Mediation of Interest Disputes by Arbitrators under the Wis-
consin Med-Arb Law for Local Government Employees, 39 ARB. J. 41, 43 (June 1984)
(reporting mediation success rate as high as 70%, though earlier experience yielded a
success rate of only 50%).
281. See Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611,
1709-12 ("chilling effect" and "narcotic effect" of fact finding and arbitration); Hogler
& Kriksciun, Impasse Resolution in Public Sector Collective Negotiations: A Proposed
Government intervention succeeds only by forcing one party or the
other to make concessions the party was unwilling to make volunta-
rily. Thus, the politics of intervention is driven by the desire of one
side to promote political intervention as a way of forcing the other
side to make concessions that are not obtainable at the bargaining ta-
ble.282 There are no objective standards for determining when the
economic cost of a labor dispute crosses the threshold justifying
emergency intervention, nor is there any continuing mechanism for
measuring economic impact.
Political intervention in railroad and airline labor disputes is not
without a plausible justification, however. If the nature of railroad
and airline businesses is such that a strike cannot be tolerated by
management, use of the strike weapon always will result in a union
victory. Under this assumption, political intervention at least gives
management a chance to balance what otherwise would be over-
whelming union power. Depending on the relative political strength
of management and labor, political intervention conceivably can re-
sult in a settlement that management can live with.
Before accepting this justification for political intervention, how-
ever, one should scrutinize both the underlying assumption that a
strike presumes a union victory and the record of political interven-
tion. The assumption has little empirical support. Indeed, Norfolk
and Western survived the 1978 strike reasonably well,28 3 and so did
the Maine Central in 1988.284 United Airlines,285 Trans World Air-
lines, 28 6 and Eastern Airlines have taken strikes in the 1980s without
capitulating. Moreover, the record of political intervention suggests
that labor more often prevails in the political arena than does
management. 28 7
In any event, it is simply illogical to suppose that additional cool-
ing-off periods make any contribution to satisfactory resolution of in-
terest disputes. Government intervention to suspend economic action
Procedure, 6 INDus. REL. L.J. 481 (1984) (permitting third-party intervention impedes
party resolution of dispute).
282. From 1976 to 1981, the author was the general counsel-labor for Conrail. Dur-
ing a number of Conrail labor disputes and national rail disputes not directly involving
Conrail, the author saw evidence of conscious efforts by rail management and shippers
to exaggerate the economic effects of rail strikes, in the hope that the President and
Congress would intervene, and force a settlement more favorable to management than
labor. The point is not to suggest that these political initiatives were not legitimate
exercises of self-interest; the point is that the threshold for government intervention is
more likely to be politically determined than shaped by economic reality.
283. Southern Ry. v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 458 F. Supp 1189
(D.S.C. 1978).
284. Burlington N.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, 481 U.S.
429 (1987).
285. ALPA v. United Airlines, Inc., 802 F.2d 886 (7th Cir. 1986).
286. IAM v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 839 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
287. See H. PERRITT, supra note 70, §§ 2.1 -.25.
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is justifiable logically only if its proponents can articulate how the
dispute will ultimately be resolved after the suspension ends and eco-
nomic action legally can resume. Government intervention also
weakens collective bargaining and leads to even more intervention.
Opposing parties are more likely to reassess their positions and to
compromise when the threat of economic pressure is imminent, than
when each thinks the government may impose a political settlement.
The executive and legislative branches of government should restrain
themselves and reserve emergency dispute intervention for true
emergencies.
F Adjudicatory Administrative Forums
The RLA allows a greater degree of government intervention than
the NLRA in interest disputes. As to other types of disputes, how-
ever, the RLA is strongly abstentionist.288 Unlike the NLRA, the
RLA authorizes no federal administrative agency to interpret the
statute or to decide claims of unfair labor practices. 28 9 In many ways,
interpretations of the RLA and the NLRA have converged, as courts
presented with RLA cases have looked to NLRA precedent to inter-
pret them.290 Nevertheless, the body of authoritative precedent for
interpreting the RLA is vastly smaller than the body of precedent for
interpreting the NLRA.291
The absence of an administrative adjudicatory forum promotes la-
bor-management cooperation by making the outcome of litigation
less predictable and more expensive. Dispute resolution theory holds
that parties are more likely to resolve their disputes voluntarily
when they are risk averse, face major uncertainty as to the resolution
obtainable from a forum authorized to decide the dispute, and face
high transaction costs in obtaining a resolution from the forum. 292
288. For a related discussion regarding transportation disputes, see Arouca & Per-
ritt, Transportation Labor Law, supra note 115, at 661-71.
289. Id.
290. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369
(1969) (RLA precludes state injunction against secondary pressure). See generally San
Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) (NLRA prevented a state
court from awarding picketing related damages).
291. Arouca & Perritt, Transportation Labor Law, supra note 115, at 628 n.73 (liti-
gation incidence data under the two statutes).
292. See G. TULLOCK, TRIALS ON TRIAL 26 (1980); Cooter & Marks, Bargaining in
the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225
(1982); Lundes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61 (1971); Perritt,
"And the Whole Earth Was of One Language: A Broad View of Dispute Resolution,"
29 VILL. L. REV. 1221, 1256 (1984).
Most union and management decision makers are risk averse. The-
ory suggests that because the outcome of RLA disputes is less pre-
dictable, and because private court litigation is more expensive to
parties than NLRB adjudication (the General Counsel's office bears
the cost of prosecuting unfair labor practice charges), employers and
unions are encouraged to resolve their disputes voluntarily.
In addition, the availability of a forum encourages parties to use
that forum to put pressure on opposing parties. It is not uncommon
for employers or labor organizations to file unfair labor practice
charges under the NLRA in order to create the risk of substantial
back-pay liability for an employer or to delay the outcome of repre-
sentation disputes. The absence of an adjudicatory forum under the
RLA removes this source of economic leverage.
While there has been some advocacy for a more adjudicatory ap-
proach under the RLA,293 it is likely that the absence of an adjudica-
tory forum promotes voluntary labor-management resolution of
disputes.
G. Effects of Secondary Pressure
After nearly a decade of uncertainty, the Supreme Court, in Bur-
lington Northern R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Em-
ployees,294 held that secondary pressure growing out of RLA major
disputes cannot be enjoined. The prospect of secondary pressure
under the RLA arguably both promotes and discourages labor-man-
agement cooperation.
Those who argue that the potential for secondary pressure pro-
motes labor-management cooperation assert that it is likely to be
used by a union only when the union's primary strike and picketing
weapons are ineffective in pressuring an employer to make conces-
sions.295 Accordingly, secondary pressure is a way of empowering a
union that otherwise lacks the power to exert meaningful pressure.
The most fundamental precept of American labor policy is that the
prospect of economic pressure induces creative problem solving. Ac-
cording to this logic, secondary pressure thus promotes labor-manage-
ment cooperation.
Union strategists observe that secondary pressure is likely to be
used only in a limited set of circumstances in which other carrier
groups within the same labor organization and other crafts of em-
ployees can be induced to honor secondary picket lines. Further-
293. See Andrews v. Louisville & N.R.R., 406 U.S. 320, 326-36 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
294. 481 U.S. 429 (1987).
295. Burlington N.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, 793 F.2d
995, 797 (7th Cir. 1986), qff'd, 481 U.S. 429 (1987).
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more, only in situations where the union engaging in secondary
pressure wishes to induce the government to appoint an emergency
board will secondary pressure be used. The second circumstance is
explained by the difficulty employees face in exerting effective pres-
sure directly on the primary target.
The emergency board motivation for secondary pressure also de-
pends upon the perception that an emergency board report would be
more favorable to the union's position than a negotiated settlement
and also would result in legislation imposing substantial portions of
the emergency board's recommendation. Of course, this perception
does not exist in all cases, and depends upon the appeal of the union's
position in the dispute.
According to the union view, secondary pressure will rarely be
used. Frequent use would encourage Congress to amend the RLA to
bar such pressure. To the extent that a particular carrier is the fre-
quent target of secondary pressure, union rank and file will become
more inclined to cross secondary picket lines. To the extent that the
availability of secondary pressure influences bargaining at all, it will
promote labor-management cooperation for the same reasons that
uncertainty of any kind encourages a negotiated agreement. The
1989 Eastern Air Lines strike supports this view. Secondary pressure
was threatened repeatedly but not, as of six weeks into the strike, ac-
tually used.
Those arguing that secondary pressure discourages labor-manage-
ment cooperation assert that allowing such pressure under the RLA
exposes employers to a virtually unlimited universe of strikes and
picketing which adversely effect their service levels and profitability.
Such exposure potentially can deplete carrier resources, making it
more difficult to finance labor-management cooperative arrange-
ments and frustrating any kind of stable collective bargaining atmos-
phere developed by a carrier with its own unions. In addition, the
prospect of repeated application of secondary pressure encourages
carriers to become aggressive in their litigation postures in order to
control the impact of secondary pressure. Such an aggressive legal
stance can spill over and poison any spirit of resolving disputes
through labor-management accommodation.
Virtually no dispute giving rise to secondary pressure can be re-
solved through the intervention of the secondary employer because,
by definition, the target employer lacks the power to resolve the un-
derlying dispute.296 The union's goal is political-to raise the level of
the dispute so as to trigger government intervention.
Finally, carriers may be encouraged to seek nonunion workforces
since they are more likely to cross secondary picket lines. Discourag-
ing union representation obviously threatens union institutional in-
terests and makes labor-management cooperation more difficult.
H. The Status Quo Requirement
The status quo requirement of section 6297 of the RLA effectively
freezes the terms and conditions of employment, whether explicitly
covered by a collective bargaining agreement or simply established by
practice, until labor and management agree to change them. The sta-
tus quo remains in effect until all of the major dispute resolution pro-
visions of the RLA have been exhausted. In other words,
management is relieved of the status quo obligation at the same time
that the union earns the right to strike. Some management repre-
sentatives believe that the status quo obligation inhibits labor-man-
agement cooperation because it reduces pressure on the union to
consider management proposals seriously.298
According to this view, the status quo obligation inhibits labor-
management cooperation because unions are political organizations.
It is extremely difficult for a union negotiator to agree to permit
management to change a term or condition of employment favorable
to rank and file employees. If, however, management can make the
change with or without union agreement, the political character of a
union supports serious and creative negotiation so that the new term
or condition of employment is one in which the employees partici-
pated in creating instead of having it imposed unilaterally by
management.
Simply eliminating the status quo requirement to put more pres-
sure on union negotiators, however, is of questionable merit. Both
the NLRA and RLA obligate employers to maintain the status quo
because collective bargaining does not really exist unless employers
are obligated to talk to employee representatives about terms and
conditions of employment as opposed to setting them unilaterally.2 99
296. See NLRB v. Enterprise Ass'n of Steam, Hot Water, Hydraulic Sprinkler,
Pneumatic Tube, Ice Machine & General Pipefitters Local 638, 429 U.S. 507 (1977) (ar-
ticulating right-to-control test for section 8(b)(4) secondary pressure analysis).
297. 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1982).
298. This section addresses the statutory status quo obligation, which governs after
expiration of any contractual status quo obligation, not contractual moratoria and no-
strike clauses which also are relatively common. However, because they are consen-
sual, they have no adverse affect on relative bargaining power.
299. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 496 n.28 (1960) (discus-
sion of rationale for section 8(a)(5) status quo obligation); see H. PERRIrr, supra note
70, § 7.13.
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Moreover, the policy of the RLA is to minimize disruption of carri-
ers. The status quo provisions of section 6 are thought to serve this
purpose because they prevent unilateral employer action possibly
leading to strikes.300
Unless there is something special about railroad and airline enter-
prises or unions relating to their ability to exert and withstand eco-
nomic pressure, criticism of the RLA status quo obligation is
basically criticism of a long-accepted American labor policy: the re-
quirement that employers maintain the status quo until a bargaining
duty is exhausted.
Assuming that employer and union status quo obligations remain
symmetrical,301 there still is room for criticism of the essentially in-
determinate length of the RLA status quo period caused by the virtu-
ally unbridled discretion of the NMB to prolong that period.302 The
efficacy of collective bargaining necessitates that employers engage in
bargaining before implementing changes in terms and conditions of
employment. However, real bargaining also depends on the existence
of deadlines. 303 NMB discretion to postpone application of economic
pressure makes the deadline prospect remote and relieves pressure
on both employers and unions to bargain diligently. The pace of ne-
gotiations could be substantially increased by setting time limits on
the duration of NMB mediation, freeing the employer of its status
quo obligation and freeing the union to strike at an earlier stage in
the bargaining process. Such a change in the RLA would be a major
step in making it more similar to the NLRA. In recent years, the
NMB became more flexible in releasing parties from mediation
quickly.304
300. See Detroit & T.S.L.R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142 (1969); Broth-
erhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Flordia E.C. Ry., 384 U.S. 238 (1966); Ruby v. TACA
Int'l Airlines, Inc., 439 F.2d 1359 (5th Cir. 1971).
301. The obligations are not symmetrical in all cases. For example, if the subject
matter of a dispute is nonmandatory, the union may be obligated not to strike, but the
employer is free to change the status quo at any time. See Japan Air Lines Co. v. IAM,
538 F.2d 46, 52-53 (2d Cir. 1976). Furthermore, strikes over minor disputes are enjoin-
able, whereas employer changes in the status quo in minor disputes usually are not
enjoinable. See H. PERRITT, supra note 70, §§ 6.5, 6.13; see also NLRB v. Insurance
Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 496-97 & n.28 (1960) (explaining difference between a
strike and employer unilateral action in terms of effect on status quo).
302. IAM v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 839 F.2d 809, 811 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
303. "A deadline serves a vital function in negotiations. It compels each side to
reach decisions and establish priorities that would not otherwise occur, at least not so
rapidly." Dunlop, The Negotiations Alternative in Dispute Resolution, 29 VILL. L.
REV. 1421, 1436 (1984).
304. NATIONAL MEDIATION BD., 1983 ANNUAL REPORT 31-33 (number of mediation
One of the major difficulties with railroad and airline collective
bargaining is that the combination of legislative success by the rail
and airline labor organizations and carriers' fear of strikes tends to
imbalance their relationship and thereby reduce the incentives for
meaningful collective bargaining. Carriers are induced to modify
their bargaining positions by the threat of union economic action. In
theory, unions are subject to similar incentives by threats of unilat-
eral carrier changes in the terms of employment. Too often, unilat-
eral change by carriers has been blocked by collateral legislation at
the state level305 or labor-protective conditions3 06 while labor organi-
zations retain the eventual right to exert their own form of economic
pressure under the RLA, uninhibited by other collateral legislation.
The combination of labor-protective legislation or administrative
orders and ad hoc government intervention served, at least until the
late 1970s, to reduce the credibility of carrier action in labor disputes.
Accordingly, labor organizations, particularly in the railroad indus-
try, were willing to modify bargaining positions only when carriers
were threatened with extinction, as in the case of Conrail,30 7 the Mil-
waukee Railroad,308 Chicago and North Western,30 9 and Rock Is-
land.1O Any changes in statutory law or in governmental attitudes
under discretionary powers delegated by present law should be ac-
companied by an appreciation of the need for incentives on both
sides, not just incentives that operate to modify employer positions.
I. Local Commuter Operations
The Northeast Rail Services Act of 1981311 transferred most com-
muter rail operations to local and regional commuter authorities, yet
cases closed was at a 10-year high, especially notable due to numerous difficult and
complex rail and airline bargaining issues).
305. For example, full-crew laws, state statutes regulating the size of train crews.
See Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 382 U.S. 423 (1966)
(in absence of clearly expressed purpose, Congress does not prevent exercise of state
police power to regulate crew size); Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Norwood, 283 U.S. 249 (1931)
(intent to prevent the exercise of state's police power to regulate crew sizes will not be
attributed to Congress unless clearly expressed).
306. See, e.g., Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-236, §§ 501-
509, 87 Stat. 985, 1012-20 (1974) (repealed 1981).
307. 45 U.S.C. § 771 (1976) (repealed 1981).
308. Id. § 908 (mandating Milwaukee Railroad and its labor organizations enter into
protective labor agreement).
309. In re Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 713 F.2d 274 (7th Cir. 1983) (upholding
the constitutionality of statutory labor protection).
310. 45 U.S.C. § 1005 (1982) (mandating labor protection agreements between Secre-
tary of Transportation and Rock Island labor organizations and limiting benefits to any
individual employee to $20,000).
311. The Northeast Rail Service Act of 1981, found in the Omnibus Budget Recon-
ciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 45 U.S.C.).
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retained RLA coverage of employment relations in those opera-
tions. 312 Increased state and municipal responsibility for running
commuter operations should be accompanied by the authority to reg-
ulate labor relations according to policy developed at the state level.
Some of management's desire to subject commuter railroad collective
bargaining to state law arises from a desire for management to enjoy
the strike prohibition contained in New York's Taylor Law.313 This
motivation, of course, is biased in favor of a substantial shift in the
balance of economic power. Apart from this, however, it is easier to
mold state law than federal law to meet the particular circumstances
of politically sensitive commuter transportation systems in metropoli-
tan regions.
J. Appointments to the NMB
The RLA, by relying on mediation to resolve both representation
disputes and interest disputes and opting not to encourage protracted
administrative litigation over its statutory rights, inherently permits
a much wider variety of labor-management cooperation than the
NLRA. Unfortunately, this potential has not been fully realized be-
cause a series of Presidential administrations of both parties have not
given proper attention to the quality of persons appointed to the
NMB. Too frequently, NMB appointees have not been persons of
true distinction or extensive experience in developing creative labor-
management solutions. This is not to say that many members of the
Board did not develop a substantial degree of expertise and creativity
once on the job, but the appointment process has left too much to on
the job training for NMB members. 314
V. GOVERNMENTALLY IMPOSED V. VOLUNTARILY NEGOTIATED
LABOR PROTECTION
A. Overview
Labor protection is a concept that both promotes and retards labor-
management cooperation. It has been embraced at various times by
both the railroad and airline industries, sometimes negotiated under
312. See United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678 (1982) (private rail-
road acquired by state subject to RLA).
313. N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 210 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1989).
314. This conclusion is not intended as a criticism of the qualifications of present
Board members; rather it is a criticism of the relative priority the White House staff
and interested union and management constituencies have given to the role of the
NMB.
the RLA, and sometimes imposed under the authority of the eco-
nomic regulatory statutes applicable to the two industries. Labor
protection is addressed here because when it is governmentally im-
posed, it removes an important issue from the bargaining table and
reduces the discretion of the parties to reach their own resolution of
the issues concerning them.
Labor protection is a collectively bargained or governmentally im-
posed employer obligation3l5 to pay employees who have been laid
off or who have suffered reduction in their compensation. Labor pro-
tective arrangements vary considerably, but the most common types
of arrangements afford protection only for loss of compensation or
employment attributable to particular enterprise events, such as
mergers or rearrangements of work assignments. The common ar-
rangements define the class of protected employees so as to exclude
employees who begin service after the program is effective, and they
typically limit the total period of protection.
Many labor protective arrangements require employees to accept
reassignment to comparable positions in order to remain eligible for
protection.3 16 Mandatory reassignment increases the likelihood that
employees can be productively employed rather than simply remain-
ing idle and receiving protective payments because their previous job
was eliminated. Mandatory reassignment requirements raise a host
of implementation questions, however, such as how far an employee
is required to relocate,3 17 who bears the cost of relocation expenses,
how dramatic a change in duties and responsibilities an employee
must accept, and who bears the cost of training or other steps neces-
sary to qualify an employee for the reassignment.
Labor protection can be an integral part of productivity bargaining
wherein an employer obtains relief from collectively bargained obli-
gations that limit its ability to restructure operations in exchange for
ameliorating the human cost of such restructuring. Labor protection
is not, however, coextensive with the employee side of productivity
bargains. Labor protection focuses on cushioning the employee costs
of enterprise change. Other productivity bargains can focus on shar-
ing the benefits of enterprise change with employees.3 18
B. Legal Alternatives for Labor Protection
The policy justification for labor protection is that employees alone
315. As explained in the following paragraphs, the government could bear the cost
of labor protection. But in most instances, railroad and airline employers have borne
the cost of both contractual and statutory labor protection.
316. See New York Dock Ry. v. United States, 609 F.2d 83, 88, 91 (2d Cir. 1979); see
also 49 U.S.C. § 11347 (1982).
317. See generally New York Dock Ry., 609 F.2d at 86-101.
318. See supra notes 175-92 and accompanying text.
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should not bear the costs of economic changes which benefit share-
holders, managers, and consumers. The legal environment for labor
protection can be represented by a continuum, ranging from
mandatory labor protection at one end, to privately negotiated and
unenforceable labor protective agreements at the other.
Governmentally mandated labor protection has two potential justi-
fications. It can be justified simply as a matter of social policy, or
more narrowly as an appropriate allocation of the costs of govern-
mentally mandated or permitted change. For example, if the govern-
ment mandates enterprise or industry structure changes that
extinguish contractual employee rights, it seems appropriate or fair
that the government ensure that the employees suffering from the
extinction of preexisting rights be compensated. 319 Similarly, if the
government requires firms to merge or to otherwise take steps that
reduce employment and earnings opportunities, it may not be appro-
priate that the employees should bear the costs of these mandated
changes.320 Though such mandates have been rare in the history of
the railroad and airline industries, they nevertheless represent a po-
tential justification for governmentally mandated labor protection.
Governmentally mandated protection, of course, can be paid for by
the public treasury or by private firms. With the exception of Title V
and the Milwaukee Railroad and Rock Island labor protective ar-
rangements,321 labor protective payments in the railroad and airline
industries have almost always been paid for by railroad and airline
employers.
Just as labor protection can be justified when the government
mandates change, it can also be justified, though less convincingly,
when the government allows change that it otherwise might prohibit.
This has been essentially the dominant justification for governmen-
tally imposed labor protection in the railroad and airline industries.
When these industries were heavily regulated, governmental permis-
sion was necessary before a railroad or airline could merge or aban-
don an unprofitable operation.322 The price of such governmental
319. An example is Title V of the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, which
expressly extinguished preexisting collectively bargained labor protection rights. Pub.
L. No. 93-236, §§ 501-509, 87 Stat. 985, 1012-20 (1974) (repealed 1981).
320. S. ROSENFIELD, LABOR PROTECTIVE PROVISIONS IN AIRLINE MERGERS 12 (1981)
(charting the history and developement of airline merger policies).
321. See supra notes 307-11 which outline the provisions Congress used to authorize
funding to pay for labor protection.
322. DEMPSEY & THOMS, supra note 30, at 230, 244 (1986); Thorns, Clear Track For
Deregulation of American Railroads, 1970-1980, 12 TRANS. P. L.J. 183, 192-93 (1982).
approval was "fair and equitable" arrangements to protect employ-
ees. Inevitably this requirement translated into the imposition of
standard employee protective arrangements.
Further along the continuum is labor protection not mandated by
the government but consensually negotiated between labor and man-
agement. Typically, such protective arrangements are agreed to by
management in exchange for employee representatives relinquishing
a previously negotiated right, such as a work rule, or employee repre-
sentatives relinquishing their right to strike.3 23
When such labor protective arrangements are negotiated privately,
without the government insisting on them, the law still has a role to
play. The law can promote such arrangements by making them le-
gally enforceable through forums provided for, and perhaps paid for,
by the state. Alternatively, the government could be hostile to such
arrangements by making them unenforceable in public forums, or
even by erecting special impediments to the economic pressures often
used to induce agreement on labor protection, for example, by classi-
fying them as nonmandatory subjects of bargaining.
A major change has occurred in the law's stance regarding labor
protection. Until deregulation, the government position was near the
extreme of pro-employee possibilities on the continuum-govern-
mentally imposed protection justified by the government allowing
carrier change. After deregulation, the government's position is
closer to the promanagement extreme-neither prohibiting nor com-
pletely enforcing labor protective agreements.324
C. History of Labor Protection
1. Private Agreements
The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad negotiated the first labor protec-
tion agreement in the 1920s. The machinists union agreed to take a
positive approach to improve efficiency in production, in exchange
for a company promise of steady employment and productivity
sharing.3 25
The Washington Job Protection Agreement of 1936 was the culmi-
nation of another major effort to provide for adjustment to change in
323. Of course, many protective arrangements were negotiated simply because of a
perception that the government would impose them if they were not agreed to by
management.
324. See Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R., 831 F.2d 1231
(3d Cir. 1987) (declining to exempt carrier from RLA duty to bargain over effects on
employees of selling all its assets, even though ICC declined to impose labor
protection).
325. See Rehmus, Collective Bargaining, supra note 18, at 88.
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the railroad industry.326 Section 7(b) of the Emergency Railroad
Transportation Act of 1933,327 which remained in effect until 1936,
provided that no railroad employees were to be laid off and that relo-
cation expenses were to be provided by the carrier involved.328 This
statutory freeze on employment termination was eliminated in ex-
change for the Washington Job Protection Agreement of 1936.
Under the Agreement, an employee deprived of employment because
of a "coordination" receives sixty percent of his prior earnings for up
to five years, depending on his length of service with the carrier. 32 9
An employee still employed but at lower compensation draws an al-
lowance for the difference between his precoordination earnings and
postcoordination earnings.3 3 0
For the three decades after the 1936 agreement, most major labor
protective developments involved the evolution of governmental re-
quirements. Purely voluntary labor protection advanced in the mid-
1960s with respect to railroad shopcraft employment. In 1962, after
experiencing shopcraft employment reductions, the six labor organi-
zations represented by the Railway Employee's Department of the
AFL-CIO proposed limitations on the contracting out of work and
otherwise limiting the adverse consequences of job losses. Specifi-
cally, they proposed application of the Washington Job Protection
Agreement to any employee displaced or deprived of employment as
a result of changes in the operation of an individual carrier, including
transfers, contracting out of work, installation of labor saving equip-
ment and machinery, and technological changes.3 31 The carriers re-
sponded with proposals to eliminate any agreements limiting carrier
implementation of technological changes, and merging the jurisdic-
tion of five of the six shopcraft unions into three work classifications.
These disputes came before Emergency Board 160 in 1964. The even-
tual settlement, on September 25, 1964, basically followed the Board's
recommendations. 33 2 By 1970, more than half of railroad employees
326. The Washington Job Protection Agreement is reproduced in the appendix to
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. United States, 571 F.2d 1190, 1206-12 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
327. Emergency Railroad Transportation Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-68, § 7(b), 48
Stat. 211, 212 (repealed 1978).
328. See United States v. Lowden, 308 U.S. 225 (1939) (approving the ICC interpre-
tation of section 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act empowering the commission to im-
pose employee protective conditions in merger approvals.)
329. See id.
330. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 571 F.2d at 1208-09 (text of The Washington Job Pro-
tection Agreement of 1936).
331. See Rehmus, Collective Bargaining, supra note 18, at 157.
332. Id at 160.
were covered by employment stabilization agreements reached in the
1960s.3 33
The peak of purely private labor protective arrangements occurred
with the 1964 Penn Central merger agreement, 34 covering more
than 100,000 employees with an estimated cost of $78,000,000.335 This
agreement provided essentially lifetime protection and guaranteed an
attrition rate not to exceed five percent annually for each employee
craft or class.33 6 Similarly, a 1965 agreement, covering BRAC, the
Telegraphers, the Maintenance of Way Employees, the Signalmen,
and the Dining Car Employees, provided attrition-based protection to
the constituents of these unions in exchange for a carrier right to
transfer work and employees from one seniority district or roster to
another, but not across union jurisdictional lines. The agreement fol-
lowed in material part recommendations made by Emergency Boards
161, 162, and 163.337
In 1987, Delta Air Lines promised employees of Western Airlines
that their compensation and job security would not be jeopardized by
the proposed merger of the two companies.3 3 8 This promise is note-
worthy because employees in many of the Delta occupations covered
by the commitment were not represented at the collective
bargaining.
2. Government Mandated Labor Protection
Government mandated labor protection derives from the govern-
ment's authority to approve industry structure changes, such as
mergers, route acquisitions, and a carrier's entry and exit into a mar-
ket. In 1920, Congress prohibited railroad acquisitions and abandon-
ments without prior Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)
approval. 339 By the early 1940s, the Supreme Court determined that
the ICC had implied authority to condition approvals of acquisi-
tions 340 and abandonments 341 on carrier agreements to provide labor
333. Id. at 89.
334. Arguably, the Penn Central would have been required to afford labor protec-
tion as a condition of ICC approval of the Pennsylvania-New York Central merger.
Nevertheless, the extensive nature of the Penn Central job stabilization agreement is
attributable, at least in part, to management's desire to obtain labor-union cooperation
in seeking ICC approval.
335. See Rehmus, supra note 18, at 121.
336. Id.
337. See id. at 165-86.
338. See generally International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 2707 v. Western Air
Lines, Inc., 813 F.2d 1359, 1364 (9th Cir. 1987) (denial of an injunction against merger if
both successor and predecessor corporations agree to accept arbitration of obligation to
protect employees affected by merger), vacated & remanded sub nom. Delta Airlines,
Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 108 S. Ct. 53 (1987).
339. Transportation Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 67-152, § 402(18), 41 Stat. 456, 477-78.
340. United States v. Lowden, 308 U.S. 225, 240 (1939).
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protection to employees affected by the transactions.'
In the Transportation Act of 1940, Congress made explicit the
ICC's obligation to require employee protection as a condition of its
approving proposed railway mergers.342 The high points of govern-
ment mandated railroad labor protection were section 405 of the Rail
Passenger Service Act 3 43 and Title V of the Regional Rail Reorgani-
zation Act of 1973 (3R Act). 344 Until Title V, the mandatory govern-
ment protection generally followed the pattern set in the 1936
Washington Job Protection Agreement, with certain additions.
345
Title V of the 3R Act afforded lifetime guarantees of 100% of aver-
age base-period compensation to all employees with more than five
years service on railroads merged into Conrail by the legislation.
346
No relationship between diminution in compensation'and the Conrail
reorganization needed to be shown to receive such benefits. By 1980,
the original fund of $250 million had been exhausted by the Title V
labor protection program and political patience had worn thin. The
Staggers Rail Act of 1980347 substantially curtailed the Title V bene-
fits and this curtailment was sustained by the special railroad
court.348 By the time the Northeast Rail Services Act of 1981349 was
enacted, the governmentally funded labor protection program was
eliminated altogether, and replaced by a more limited severance pro-
gram with modest government funding.3 50 When Conrail stock was
sold by the federal government to the public, the Title V labor pro-
tection had been replaced by a supplemental unemployment benefits
program.351
341. ICC v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 315 U.S. 373, 380 (1942).
342. Transportation Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-785, § 7, 54 Stat. 898, 906-07 (re-
pealed 1978).
343. 45 U.S.C. § 565 (1982).
344. Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-236, §§ 501-509, 87
Stat. 985, 1012-20 (1974) (repealed 1981).
345. See New York Dock Ry. v. United States, 609 F.2d 83, 86-90 (2d Cir. 1979).
346. Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-236, §§ 501-09, 87 Stat.
985, 1016-1017 (1974) (repealed 1981). However, employees with less than five years of
service were protected only for as long after the commencement of Conrail as the total
of their pre-Conrail service. Id.
347. Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1985 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 49
U.S.C.).
348. See Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 1554 (Re-
gional Rail Reorg. Ct. 1983) (upholding constitutionality of restrictions on Conrail la-
bor protection), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1101 (1984).
349. 45 U.S.C. § 797 (1982).
350. Id. § 797(d)(1) (limiting total payments to any employee to $20,000).
351. See Conrail Privatization Act, Pub. L. No. 99-509, §§ 4024(c)-(f), 100 Stat. 1908
(1985).
Meanwhile, Congress reformed economic regulation of the railroad
industry, primarily through the Staggers Act, recodifying the author-
ity for governmentally imposed railroad labor protection at the same
time.35 2 Subsequently, the ICC announced a policy of not imposing
labor protection in acquisition cases. The ICC was primarily moti-
vated by the tendency of labor protective obligations to discourage
transactions that could maintain rail service which otherwise would
be discontinued.
Airline labor protection routinely was imposed by the Civil Aero-
nautics Board (CAB) as a condition of its approving mergers, acquisi-
tions, or route transfers.35 3 In many cases, the terms of labor
protection were agreed to by the parties as part of their submission to
the CAB.354 Protective arrangements typically include integration of
seniority lists, mandatory arbitration of disputes, and up to four years
compensation for adverse affects on earnings or jobs due to the ap-
proved transaction.3 55 No statute ever has required imposition of la-
bor protection in the airline industry. Rather, the CAB acted under
its discretionary authority to approve transactions such as mergers,
acquisitions, and consolidations.3 56
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978357 established an employee
protection program for airline employees whose employment had
been adversely affected by deregulation.35 8 After its enactment, the
CAB advised airline industry management not to expect routine im-
position of labor protection, but rather to rely on the collective bar-
gaining process.3 59 Deferral to collective bargaining was justified by
the characteristics of a deregulated environment in which new en-
trants would be free to serve markets jeopardized by labor strife
flowing from structural changes.3 60
352. See 49 U.S.C. § 10901(e) (1982) (granting the ICC discretionary authority to re-
quire sufficient employee protection provided by railway operators); id. § 10903(b)(2)
(requiring labor protection in abandonments); id. § 10901(e) (requiring labor protection
for employees affected by newly constructed lines); id. § 11347 (requiring labor protec-
tion in mergers and other acquisitions of control); see also Railway Labor Executives'
Ass'n v. ICC, 784 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1986) (considering the effect of the Regional Rail
Reorganization Act and Staggers Act changes).
353. ALPA v. Department of Transp., 791 F.2d 172, 174 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Braniff
Master Executive Council v. CAB, 693 F.2d 220, 222-23 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
354. Braniff, 693 F.2d at 228.
355. Id at 222 & n.2 (summarizing "standard" Allegheny-Mohawk conditions).
356. 49 U.S.C. § 1378(b)(1) (1982). This section provides that "unless ... the Board
finds that the transaction will not be consistent with the public interest.., it shall, by
order, approve such transaction, upon such terms and conditions as it shall find to be
just and reasonable and with such modifications as it may prescribe." Branif, 693 F.2d
at 227 (rejecting union claim that CAB was obligated to impose protective conditions).
357. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-08 (1982).
358. Id. § 1552; see also Branif, 693 F.2d at 228.
359. Branif, 693 F.2d at 229.
360. ALPA v. Department of Transp., 791 F.2d 172, 175-76 (1986).
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D. The Exchange Nature of Labor Protection
Labor protection can simply be a social benefit to employees, or it
can represent the employees' part of an exchange with an em-
ployer.36 1 Originally, railroad labor protection represented an ex-
change of employee economic security for greater employer
flexibility in order to make operations more efficient through consol-
idations. As the concept evolved through the 1940s, the concept ex-
panded to include abandonments of unprofitable operations.
Although labor protection expanded, there was no corresponding ex-
pansion of employer rights. Employers already had the right to aban-
don operations with ICC approval. What happened in the mid-1940s
was that the ICC approval of abandonments came to be conditioned
upon affording labor protection to adversely effected employees.
The Penn Central agreement also can be characterized as an ex-
change, albeit a political one, by its protecting the economic security
of all employees of the affected railroads in exchange for allowing
the merger of the New York Central and Pennsylvania Railroads. 36 2
Similarly, the Conrail protection can be characterized as a kind of
political exchange in which the constituents of rail labor organiza-
tions were afforded economic security in exchange for consenting to
the legislatively imposed restructuring of the Northeast railroads.
Similarly, the more modest Milwaukee Railroad363 and Rock Is-
land Railroad 36 4 conditions represent an exchange. Congress granted
public funding and took other actions to prevent the complete shut-
down of the Milwaukee and Rock Island systems in exchange for la-
bor's acceptance of modest labor protection. Apparently, Congress
had become impatient with labor's seemingly unlimited appetite for
lifetime protection.
E. Productivity Bargaining
Productivity bargaining involves an exchange of employee benefits
for employer flexibility similar in some ways to labor protection, yet
361. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 1554, 1558 (Re-
gional Rail Reorg. Ct. 1983) (labor protection provisions constituted social welfare leg-
islation rather than contractual benefits), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1101 (1984).
362. See J. HARR, THE GREATEST RAILWAY CRISIS: AN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES RAILWAY ASSOCIATION 200 (1978); R. SAUNDERS, THE RAILROAD
MERGERS AND THE COMING OF CONRAIL 195-96 (1978).
363. 45 U.S.C. § 908 (1982); In re Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 713 F.2d 274 (7th
Cir. 1983) (upholding constitutionality of statutory labor protection).
364. 45 U.S.C. § 1005 (1982).
different in other ways.36 5 The specific work rule issues which pre-
occupied management and labor through the 1960s and into the 1970s
regarding the operating crafts, diesel firemen, and crew consist were
resolved through productivity bargaining rather than the kind of gen-
eral labor protection discussed in the preceding sections. Operating
craft employees already had lifetime labor protection in many cases
and wanted something more in exchange for conceding crew reduc-
tions on locomotives and freight trains.36 6 The outline of a productiv-
ity agreement in both the fireman and crew consist areas began to
emerge with the "lonesome pay" concept for engineers as a part of
the eventual resolution of the diesel fireman dispute.3 67 The lone-
some pay notion stresses that remaining crew members should re-
ceive a share of productivity gains resulting from the elimination of
certain crew positions. The Chicago and Northwestern Railway pro-
posed the idea be used to reduce train crews. The UTU initially re-
sisted, but then accepted that remaining members of a smaller train
crew should receive extra payments for working without one of the
brakemen.368
This concept was formalized to a greater extent in Conrail's 1978
crew consist agreement. In that agreement, the employer agreed to
pay a fixed dollar amount into a productivity savings sharing trust
fund each time a crew was operated without a second brakeman.
Under the collective bargaining agreement and the accompanying
trust agreement, all employees in service when the agreement was
signed were entitled to shares from the trust fund in proportion to
the number of times they worked on smaller crews.36 9
This agreement compensated employees for lost job opportunities
and also arguably compensated them for extra work or vigilance re-
quired on smaller crews.37 0 Congress supplemented the Conrail crew
consist agreement in the 1981 Northeast Rail Services Act by provid-
ing for mandatory elimination of certain positions, in exchange for
publicly funded payments. 371
The viability of the Conrail crew consist productivity bargaining ar-
365. It is the author's contention that labor protection focuses on cushioning the
employee costs of enterprise change whereas productivity bargaining focuses on shar-
ing the benefits of enterprise change with employees.
366. See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL RAILROAD COMMISSION 46 (1962) [hereinaf-
ter PRESIDENTIAL REPORT] (traditional labor protection insufficient for firemen be-
cause they are impacted more directly by elimination of diesel fireman positions).
367. BLE Study Commission, supra note 154, at 168-70.
368. Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 336 F. Supp. 1149, 1159-61 (N.D.
Ill. 1971), rev'd & remanded, 471 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 917
(1973).
369. CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORP., 1979 ANNUAL REPORT 8-9 (1980).
370. Only those employees who were employed at the time the agreement was
signed were eligible for these benefits. Id.
371. 45 U.S.C. § 797(a) (1982); United Transp. Union v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 535
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rangement was attacked from two camps. First, subordinate union
officials brought a suit claiming that the agreement had been reached
without their consent as required under the union constitution. A
federal magistrate invalidated the agreement as it applied to them,
but Congress subsequently repudiated the magistrate's decision.3 72
Second, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (BLE) sought to
maintain a pay differential measured from enhanced crew earnings
including trust fund payments without giving anything in return.
Congress passed a joint resolution373 temporarily resolving this dis-
pute without entirely vitiating the integrity of the concept that pro-
ductivity gains should be shared only with those employees
sacrificing employment opportunities represented by a work rule.374
In the airline industry, labor protection has been used less explicitly
as a means of productivity bargaining.
F. Impact of Labor Protection on Labor-Management Cooperation
Collectively bargained labor protection can promote labor-manage-
ment cooperation by providing a means to protect employees from
economic loss associated with changes in a collective bargaining
agreement.3 75 Particularly when work rules are changed which in
turn reduce employment opportunities, labor protection providing for
maintenance of compensation levels can be a useful way of sharing
the gains from productivity bargaining. It is important to note, how-
ever, that some of the most prominent lifetime protection arrange-
ments resulted from poor management judgment rather than a
F. Supp. 697 (Regional Rail Reorg. Ct. 1982) (dispute over various aspects of the 3R
Act), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1133 (1982).
372. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1430, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 134-35, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4166-67. An element of the magistrate's decision was that
section 504(d) of the Regional Rail Reorganization Act did not require a single agree-
ment for each craft or class on Conrail. The House Committee, referring to the opin-
ion, reiterated congressional intent that a single agreement was required. Id.
373. Railway Labor-Management Dispute Resolution Act, Pub. L. No. 97-262, 96
Stat. 1130-31 (1982) (National Carriers' Conference Committee and certain employees
represented by Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, which were in dispute, were in-
structed to take all necessary steps to restore service and maintain the status quo).
374. BLE Study Commission, supra note 154, at 178-84 (restating arguments of both
sides without resolving the matter).
375. See PRESIDENTIAL REPORT, supra note 367, at 75 (recommending extension of
employee protection to those affected by technological change); see also Rehmus, Col-
lective Bargaining, supra note 18, at 224-25 (explaining how labor protection enables
railroad craft unions to accommodate profound technological change).
government mandate.376 Once labor protection exists, it operates as a
disincentive for certain types of labor-management cooperation. Em-
ployers obligated to pay employees regardless of whether they work
have no short-term incentive to improve efficiency through measures
that will reduce labor costs for productive work. Union constituents
assured of compensation regardless of whether they have jobs or not
have no incentive to negotiate changes in collective bargaining agree-
ments that will permit long-run improvements in employment
through greater enterprise success.
Government imposed labor protection can be a serious impediment
to healthy bargaining. Requiring employers to afford lifetime guar-
antees of current compensation levels can eliminate any employer in-
centive to become more efficient. The employer must pay the
employees whether they work or not. Railroad labor protection
schemes imposed by the government typically require maintenance
of collectively bargained terms and conditions of employment in the
course of carrier reorganizations. Contravening general concepts of
change in ownership embodied in American labor policy,3 77 these
types of labor protective provisions, superimposed on the status quo
provisions of the RLA, further reduce or eliminate incentives for
either labor or management to cooperate in making the enterprise
more efficient.
A legitimate distinction exists between labor protection limited to
the effects of a particular transaction and that which is uncondi-
tional. The former type prevails in the airline industry; the latter
type is more common in the railroad industry. Protection limited to
the provable effects of a particular transaction is easier to justify as a
means of cushioning the human impact of a government-approved re-
structuring. A distinction also can be drawn between protective ar-
rangements that freeze collectively bargained job assignments and
work rules and arrangements that provide compensation for eco-
nomic injury resulting from more efficient operations. The latter
type provides more flexibility to employers while still protecting em-
ployee interests. Therefore, it is more consistent with an exchange
approach to labor-management cooperation. The trend in recent
years to eliminate government imposed labor protection 378 is desira-
376. See Perritt, supra note 57, at 285-89 (discussing the conditions surrounding the
Penn Central bankruptcy and subsequent merger).
377. See John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 549-51 (1964); see also How-
ard Johnson Co., Inc. v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Int'l Union, 417
U.S. 249, 262-65 (1974).
378. See Winter v. ICC, 828 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1987) (describing the ICC's policy on
labor protection); ALPA v. Department of Transp., 791 F.2d 172, 174-75 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (discussion of the CAB's policy change to discontinue requiring labor protective
provisions before approval of an airline acquisition); Braniff Master Executive Council
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ble and should be continued.379
The legitimate interests of employees in economic security should
be addressed through collective bargaining. The law ought to ensure
that collectively bargained labor protective arrangements are en-
forceable 38 0 and that both labor and management are allowed to ex-
ert economic pressure to promote timely resolution of disagreements
about labor protective arrangements. 38 1
VI. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEREGULATION AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Deregulation of the railroad and airline industries has increased
the importance of collective bargaining because it redresses the im-
balance of economic power which existed for many years in the in-
dustrial relations systems of both industries. Economic regulation
benefits unions because it restricts product market competition
which can put pressure on both employment and wage and benefit
levels. Also, the existence of comprehensive regulation provides nu-
merous opportunities for political intervention by trade unions to
change the balance of power in collective bargaining, or to pursue
objectives through regulation not obtainable through collective
bargaining.
Deregulation has affected collective bargaining in the railroad and
airlines industries through three basic mechanisms. First, deregula-
tion of rates and fares affects collective bargaining because it facili-
tates price competition in the product markets. Price competition
encourages employers to bargain harder in order to reduce labor
costs, thereby improving their ability to compete based on price. Sec-
ond, deregulation of market entry makes it easier for new carriers
with lower labor costs to steal market share from more mature or-
ganized carriers. This phenomenon has been more important in the
airline industry which enjoys stable or growing demand, than in the
railroad industry which faces declining demand. In the railroad in-
v. CAB, 693 F.2d 220, 222-23 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (describing genesis of labor challenge to
new DOT policy on airline labor protection).
379. But see R. Crandall, Chairman and President, American Airlines, Inc., Re-
marks Before the Airline Industrial Relations Conference 11-16 (June 17, 1987) (pro-
posing that government set a floor for medical insurance, pension benefits, and other
issues affecting airline labor costs).
380. See supra notes 175-227 for a discussion of enforceability.
381. This relates directly to the characterization of labor protection as a mandatory
subject of bargaining under the RLA, as discussed supra notes 194-206 and accompany-
ing text.
dustry, freer market entry has permitted long standing carriers to
exit certain markets and be replaced by short line carriers.38 2 Free-
dom of short line carriers to enter the market reduces shipper and
community political pressure that would otherwise inhibit a trunk
line carrier from exiting a market. Third, deregulation of market
exit means that carriers can retreat from markets in which they are
not competitive. This creates a direct and short-run threat to em-
ployment opportunities if employee representatives resist reducing
labor costs to meet competitive pressures.
The combination of all three mechanisms pressures union parties
to address enterprise efficiency concerns. It is possible for a deregu-
lated air or rail carrier to develop a collective bargaining strategy in
which the carrier threatens to exit a market and turn it over to a
new entrant if its employee representatives do not agree to substan-
tial concessions permitting the carrier to charge lower rates. Such a
strategy depends upon all three mechanisms in order to be credible.
Deregulation, therefore, has shifted the balance of power in collec-
tive bargaining in favor of employers.
Product market competition also invigorates collective bargaining.
Collective bargaining, like any negotiation process, depends upon the
parties' perceptions as to what the alternatives are to a negotiated
agreement. Both labor and management experience important in-
traconstituency political pressures in translating these perceptions
into collective bargaining positions. If rank and file union constitu-
ents believe that a carrier will survive in the marketplace no matter
how high its labor costs, then the constituents will resist strongly any
employer proposals to reduce labor costs. This phenomenon was
prevalent for many years in the railroad industry when carriers con-
tinued to operate through bankruptcy and emerged without signifi-
cant changes in employment terms. The threatened breakup of
Conrail, the actual breakup of the Rock Island, and the shrinking of
the Milwaukee Railroad, all of which occurred in the twilight years
of detailed economic regulation, changed rank and file employee per-
ceptions in a fundamental way and made railroad collective bargain-
ing more effective.
Airline employees for many years perceived that airlines would not
go out of business regardless of their level of efficiency. During the
1960s and 1970s, failing carriers typically were merged into healthier
carriers as an exercise of regulatory policy.38 3 Deregulation has al-
382. Thorns, supra note 323, at 213 (Staggers Act has a relaxed standard of entry
which facilitates the operation of short-line railroads carved from defunct railroads
such as the Rock Island).
383. Trans Caribbean Airlines was merged into American Airlines and Allegheny
Airlines acquired Mohawk Airlines. Rosenfield, History and Development of Airline
Merger Policies, LABOR PROTECTIVE PROVISIONS IN AIRLINE MERGERS 31-32 (1981).
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tered significantly the employees' perception that if their current em-
ployer goes under, the will be able to work for another healthier
employer.
Employer postures at the bargaining table result from manage-
ment's perception of industrial relations. Corporate decisions are
made by accommodating various functional departments, such as fi-
nancial, operating, strategic planning, and governmental relations,
not unilaterally by labor relations executives who may have a more
current and sophisticated perception of industrial relations. If signifi-
cant parties within the decision making group of an air or rail carrier
perceive that they can win any strikes and that their competitors will
compete with lower labor costs, they will pursue an aggressive em-
ployer bargaining stance, even if these perceptions prove to be
inaccurate.
Aggressive bargaining by employers results in more vigorous col-
lective bargaining. Carried too far, however, aggressive employer
practices can destabilize collective bargaining when employers ignore
deeply held and legitimate employee interests that will surface one
way or another.38 4 The problem with relying on economic forces to
encourage labor-management cooperation is that a certain ebb and
flow of power is inevitable. An obvious example is the airline indus-
try, in which economic conditions favored union power during most
of the decades of the 1960s and 1970s, but favored management power
during much of the 1980s. Whenever either side transcends the
other, the weaker factions can be expected to complain in political
forums.
Political scientists know that intensity of interest in a particular is-
sue is an important variable in determining how effective interest
groups will be in influencing legislative action.38 5 Historical experi-
ence suggests that legislative intervention into railroad and airline
disputes is an alternative always given serious consideration by legis-
384. It is notable that one commentator credits product market competition and as-
sociated wage cuts in the early years of the airline industry with the beginning of col-
lective bargaining in the industry. See Kahn, supra note 48, at 100.
385. See J. HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES 29 (1982) Professor Hurst discusses the
limitations that resources, diffusion of interest, and other factors may present in ob-
taining legislative response. Id. He suggests that legislatures are fundamentally insti-
tutions that provide broad arenas for bargaining among diverse interests. Id. Most
people interest themselves in the legislative process, but only when a matter under
consideration has material importance for them. Id.; see also V.0. KEY, POLITICS, PAR-
TIES AND PRESSURE GROUPS 7 (1942) (politics is a struggle among groups or interests).
See generally Cass, Models of Administrative Action, 72 VA. L. REV. 363 (1986); Sun-
stein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985).
lators. Such intervention may take the form of changes in the RLA,
or more likely, in the form of reregulating product markets or impos-
ing labor protections. If the collective bargaining system is not re-
sponsive to the deeply felt needs of rank and file employees, it is
possible and even likely that these employees will actively encourage
their representatives to promote legislative intervention of some sort.
To some extent, these employee concerns can be addressed through
more progressive management techniques. This is especially true re-
garding employee desires to participate in enterprise management
and receive fair treatment by employers. Similarly, voluntary em-
ployment security arrangements, whether unilaterally established by
employers or established through collective bargaining, can reduce
employee anxieties regarding job security and deteriorating employ-
ment conditions. Credible long-term accommodation of employee
concerns, however, is likely only through collective bargaining.
Rank and file employee aspirations and grievances will be vented
via some kind of political outlet. Collective bargaining represents an
alternative channel through which these employees can communicate
their desires. Absent such a channel, these feelings will be expressed
to government institutions. It is naive to suppose that employees de-
prived of the collective bargaining channel will not contact their
elected representatives in Congress or in state legislatures and rec-
ommend regulation of carrier employment policies. If collective bar-
gaining is responsive to employee concerns, there is a reasonable
basis for the government to keep its hands off.
Despite deregulation and the resulting revitalization of competitive
forces which have strengthened collective bargaining, a number of
threats to deregulation nevertheless exist, such as the previously dis-
cussed frustration of strongly felt employee aspirations. Other
threats, both economic and political, also exist. Historically, air and
rail transportation systems in western industrialized countries have
been subsidized, either directly or indirectly, through economic regu-
lation.38 6 It is far too soon to tell how the railroad short line, railroad
rate competition, and low cost airline phenomena will evolve. It may
be that the possible economic collapse of major carriers and resulting
threat to essential transportation services, poor carrier service, or
widespread safety problems38 7 will motivate a reregulation of the
railroad and airline industries.
386. Economic regulation can serve as an indirect subsidy by keeping rates artifi-
cially high, or by limiting new entrants.
387. Dempsey, Collision Course, supra note 30, at 352-55. For an illustration of sig-
nificant safety violations by domestic carriers, N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 1988, § A, at 7, col.
6; N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1988, § A, at 34, col. 1; L.A. Times, Oct. 24, 1988, § 4 (Business),
at 2, col. 6.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Plausible arguments can be made that certain features of the RLA
and other industry bargaining customs inhibit labor-management co-
operation. Yet, as one union practitioner put it:
I ... [am] convinced that, as in general life situations, we always seek a per-
fect society-one without problems--and, in attempting to fine tune it, end up
creating a system that is less perfect or, at least, has as many problems,
though of a different variety. In short, the RLA generally has accomplished
the purposes that it was set out to perform. There has been a relatively high
degree of labor stability in comparison to rail workers in other countries and
in other industries within the [United] [S]tates.3 88
It would be wrong to conclude that the RLA has prevented adapta-
tion to change in railroad and airline industries. It may have slowed
it down, but it did not prevent it. As Professor Rehmus pointed out,
collective bargaining in the railroad industry has adapted to enor-
mous employment declines and changes in technology.3 8 9 It may be
that the degree of resistance and the degree of governmental inter-
vention was necessary, given the magnitude of the changes and their
adverse impact, on legitimate employee and union institutional
interests.390
Similarly, collective bargaining in the airline industry has adapted
to the introduction of the jet airplane, to deregulation, and to the
commuter airline phenomenon without a significant disruption of
transportation services. Many criticisms of the RLA from both man-
agement and labor have been occasioned by the difficulties exper-
ienced during this adaptation by both industries. The RLA, after all,
leaves more discretion to the collective bargaining parties than do
other prominent American collective bargaining statutes. Shortcom-
ings in labor-management relations in the railroad and airline indus-
tries are more attributable to failures of imagination or courage than
to failures of the law. It is appropriate to change anachronistic gov-
ernmental policies and management or union behavior, but it may
not be appropriate to change the Act itself, especially by making it
more detailed or rigid in its terms.
Earlier, this article observed that labor-management cooperation is
more a function of party attitudes than of law. The same observation
holds true when applied to collective bargaining in the railroad and
airline industries. Because of the broad discretion allowed to the
388. Letter from Harold A. Ross to Henry H. Perritt, Jr. (Sept. 4, 1987) (discussing
various facets of labor-management relations).
389. See Rehmus, Collective Bargaining, supra note 18, at 223-27.
390. Id. at 134-37.
NMB and to the President by the RLA, the way in which the Act
channels labor-management conduct is very much a function of the
prevailing attitudes of the Board, Presidential administrations, and
emergency boards. Therefore, many criticisms of the Act addressed
herein can be resolved by appropriate governmental attitudes with-
out amending the RLA.
The courts have important roles in interpreting and enforcing RLA
duties. However, they have been willing in numerous cases of first
impression to defer to the practical realities of collective bargaining
history,391 and sometimes were influenced by views expressed by
agencies charged with administering major portions of the Act.392
There is no reason why future administrations should not express
their views through amicus curiae briefs if judicial interpretation
threatens to frustrate important objectives of the RLA as understood
by that administration. The greatest opportunities for improving gov-
ernment attitudes toward influencing labor-management cooperation
relate to the control of strike timing, the use of emergency dispute
resolution processes, and the fragmentation of collective bargaining.
The RLA is virtually unique in American collective bargaining law
in the degree of discretion it delegates to the NMB to control the tim-
ing of economic pressure. The Supreme Court has observed that the
timing of economic pressure can mean everything in terms of the bal-
ance of power between labor and management. 393 There is a ten-
dency for the availability of extended interest dispute resolution
processes under the RLA to chill effective bargaining. Parties wish-
ing to delay the timing of economic pressure can pursue these ave-
nues of bargaining and stretch out the mediation process. Far more
frequently, however, parties simply fail-with no actual intent to de-
lay-to confront the real need to change their positions until either a
strike threat or unilateral promulgation threat looms. Skilled
mediators, with appropriate general policy direction from the NMB
itself, can use their virtually unreviewable discretion to control the
timing of economic pressure and reduce these harmful tendencies.
Additionally, when unions or carriers seek to act in a way that dis-
rupts a desirable bargaining structure, the mediation process can
limit the effectiveness of these acts by controlling the timing of eco-
391. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Atlantic C.L.R.R., 383 F.2d 225, 229 (D.C.
Cir. 1967) (good faith bargaining obligation determined by past bargaining practices),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1047 (1968).
392. See Pan American World Airways v. Flight Eng'rs Int'l Ass'n, 306 F.2d 840, 848
(2d Cir. 1962) (citing NMB's amicus brief in support of conclusion that second round of
mediation does not reinstate RLA status quo obligation).
393. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 496 n.27 (1960) (quoting
Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1401, 1440-41 (1958).
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nomic pressure so that it coincides with mediation releases in other
cases then pending before the NMB.
As to the fragmentation of collective bargaining among many dif-
ferent units, the Board has almost absolute discretion to define elec-
tion units, though it has not acknowledged this discretion officially.
The NMB should use this discretion to ensure that representation
units reflect appropriate changes in technology and the reality of in-
dustrial relations. In some cases, of course, dramatic change in elec-
tion units is not appropriate. Nevertheless, the Board can encourage
coordinated bargaining among groups with similar concerns who tend
to follow similar patterns by creatively controlling the timing of eco-
nomic pressure.
Another opportunity for improvement involves the tendency of
some emergency boards to undercut desirable forms of productivity
bargaining. The clearest example is Emergency Board 200. This
Board created disincentives for carriers and labor organizations to en-
gage in productivity bargaining by declining to reject a pay differen-
tial claim based on a productivity bargain negotiated by another
union. The BLE Study Commission resulting from the emergency
board declined to reject the idea that the engineers should receive a
differential restoring payment even without productivity
bargaining.3 94
As a matter of policy, it is difficult to control the substantive con-
clusions of fact finding panels since they are, by statute, intended to
be independent and ad hoc in nature. Nevertheless, it is desirable
that emergency boards, the NMB, and future Presidential adminis-
trations administer the Act and perform their functions-with an ap-
propriate view toward labor-management cooperation. These groups
must also ensure that their actions do not undercut the incentives for
creativity in private agreements.
Appropriate restraint in using emergency dispute processes already
has been demonstrated by four different Presidential administra-
tions, both Republican and Democrat. If collective bargaining is to
flourish as an instrument of labor-management cooperation, it is es-
sential that this restraint continue. No statutory change was neces-
sary for the level of intervention to diminish in the early 1970s and
none is necessary now to continue this aversion to intervention.
Eventually, it may be desirable to combine the RLA with the
394. BLE Study Commission, supra note 154, at 178-84. The dispute is described
more fully supra notes 366-75 and accompanying text.
NLRA, but this is not an important issue at the present time. First,
merging the two acts does not seem high on the agenda of any group
interested in labor-management cooperation. Second, as this article
suggests, greater discretion for private parties and less detailed RLA
statutory obligations and privileges provide room for more creative
and effective leadership by the parties and the government. This in
turn helps the parties to channel their energies in constructive ways;
merging the two acts would reduce this desirable flexibility. Fur-
thermore, such a merger would incite unnecessary political warfare
over the interpretation of novel statutory arrangements. Therefore,
it may not be appropriate to change the RLA at all,395 but only
change the attitudes of those administering it.
395. Section 2 of the RLA is susceptible of interpretations prohibiting employer-
employee committees and carrier funding of union institutional adjustment. Amend-
ing only section 2 to prevent such an interpretation would be appropriate. See supra
notes 175-92, 214-15 and accompanying text.
